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PREFACE
My interest in Soren Kierkegaard began in 1971 as a
freshman in college.

I was immediately challenged personally

and awed at the applicability of Kierkegaard's critical perceptions.

Since then I have assimilated much of Kierkegaard's

concepts.

I now approach virtually all of life utilizing the

delineations found in Kierkegaard's works.

I have yet much

to learn about balancing the maieutical approach with the
call to proclaim or directly announce the gospel of Christ.
But here is where I see myself as distinguished from most
Kierkegaardian scholarss

in my view of Christ.

I see in

Kierkegaard a true New Testament faith in Jesus Christ coupled
with an extraordinary genius.
Kierkegaard a2ways wrote to "that individual."

As

an individual, I am tremendously grateful to him for the
edifying influence that he has had on me.

I also want to

thank Mr. James Grier for helping me not to be afraid to
think, and Dr. Robert Roberts for directing my interests in
Kierkegaard.

I hope to be the type of influence to others as

these men have been to me.
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Soren Kierkegaard is presented as a Christian corrective to nineteenth century idealism.

The nature of ideal-

ism is described as it arises in Hegelianism, the ecclesiastical structure, and the cultural setting.

The Hegelian ontolory

of "pure thought," the principle of "mediation," and the
striving for "objectivity" are presented as the fundamental
obstacles to the assimilation of Christianity.
approaches these issues maieutically.

Kierkegaard

This method is discussed

as it relates to the author and his works.

The stages of

existence (i.e. Aesthetic, Ethical, Religiousness A, and
Religiousness B) are described in relation to Kierkegaard's
maieutical approach.
discussed.

Kierkegaard's Christological concern is

Comments are directed to his presentation of God

and his view of the historical approach.

Christ is presented

as the "paradox," "absrdity," and "offense."

The nature of

Christian existence is described as it relates to ^hrist in
contemporaneity

and the overcoming of offense in faith.

CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL SETTING
A Feel for "The Dialectical"
It is imperative that a feel for the concept of "the
dialectical" be gained in order to understand the writings of
Soren Kierkegaard.

This, however, is no easy task.

itself is very abstruse.

The term

Generally, the word "dialectic" is

associated with Hegel who uses the term in the context of
idealism.

However, other nineteenth century thinkers also

utilized a concept of "the dial,ctical."

It appears, for ex-

ample, in the materialism of Marx and the scientific observations of Darwin.
presented.

So too with Kierkegaard the concept is again

But Kierkegaard does not present "the dialectical"

as something to philosophize about; rather, "the dialectical"
is an integral aspect of Kierkegaard's activity as an author.
I have yet to find a passage in Kierkegaard which explains
how he defines and utilizes this term.

Nevertheless, the con-

cept of "the dialectical" is ever present throughout the au
thorship.

Once the reader has gained a feel for "the dia-

lectical," Kierkegaard's activity as a corrective author becomes more understandable.
In the attempt to understand this obscure concept,
one immediately encounters two major obstacles.

First, the
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term is difficult to define.

There are a numt- er of different

definitions and some are completely contrary to others.
Second, the term is used to refer to a multitude of different
situations.

In Kierkegaard, both these obstacles challenge

the reader.

Unless the reader is armed with a sensitivity

for the concept of "the dialectical," the confrontation with
Kierkegaard can result in confusion and misinterpretation.
Let me show you what I mean.

The following is a ran-

dom selection of various passages where Kierkegaard employs
the term "dialectic."

The obstacles of definition and appli-

cation of the term should become readily apparent.
Concerning himself:
I cannot repeat too often what I have so often said:
I am a poet, but of a quite particular kinds for
dialectic is the essential qualification of my nature
and normally dialectic is foreign to poets.
I can only beg the reader not to think of revelations
or anything 9f that sort, for with me everything is
dialectical.'
Concerning inquiry:
If the presentation of the problem fails in dialectical clarity, while exceptional learning and great
acumen are expended upon the details, it becomes
only increasingly difficult for the dialecIically
interested inquirer to find his way about.)

1_
-.)oren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard,
trans. Alexander Dr l: (London and New Yorks Oxford University
Press. 1938). p. 258

"Soren Kierkegaard. Pcint of View for My Work as an
Author, trans. Walter Lowrie (London and New York: Oxford
University Press, 1939), P. 83.
3Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscr.Lpt.
trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 15.
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Con^erning the God

elationship:

For the true extraordinarius will not be comforted
nor seek relief nor find relief in the public, but
only in God; and therein consists the dialectical,
which is anGtish and crisis but at the same time
blessedness.4
Concerning existence:
Reality or existence is the dialectical moment in a
trilogy, the beginning and the end of which are not
there for an existing individual since qua existing,
individual he is himself in the dialectical moment.
Concerning his authorship:
So it is in the case of a dialectical reduplication;
and the mark of a dialectical. reduplication is that
the ambiguity is maintained.°
Concerning Religiousness B (Christianity)*
The difficulty consists merely in holding fast the
qualitative dialectic of the absolute paradox and
bidding defiance to the illusions. In the case of
that which can and shall be and wills to be the
absolute paradox, the incomprehensible, it requires
passion to hold fast dialectically the definition of
incomprehensibility.'
Concerning the dialectical:
Everything turns upon making the distinction absolute
between quantitative dialectic and qualitative dialectic. All logic is quantitative dialectic or modal
dialectic, for everything is and the whole is one and
the same. Qualitative dialectic belongs in existence

'Soren Kierkegaard, On Authority and Revelation,
trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, N.J. 1.5rinceton University
Press, 1955), p. 32.
5Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
1D• 279.
6
Kierkegaard, Point of View, pp. 16-17.
7Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
P. 498.
8
Soren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, trans, Howard
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington, Indiana and London:
Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 352

It is obvious from these passages that we are not
dealing here with a simple concept.

The ambiguity can, how-

ever, be minimized once the reader is equipped with a perspective which is sensitive to this fundamental ingredient of
Kierkegaard's authorship.
In attempting to define "the dialectical," it must he
remembered that we are not defining a simple object, but a
complex concept.

Hence, it is best that the reader not have

a simple definition or synonym to apply every time the term
"dialectic" is confronted.

Instead the reader should be

famili'r with the abstract concept cf "the dialectical"
and allow the context of the passage to delineate a more
definite interpretation of this complex term.
The most popular proponent of dialectics is Hegel.
Here the term is used in the context of idealism and logic.
In its common usage, "dialectic" generally connotes logic or
reflection.
synonyms.

Hence the terms "logician

and "dialectician" are

Kierkegaard calls himself a dialectician and more

often than not his usage of the term "dialectic" can be interpreted as relating to logic, argumentation and the like.

In

the above quote, where Kierkegaard asks the reader not to consider him as having received revelations because with him
everything is dialectical, we can safely translate "dialecti
cal" into "loical" or "reflection."

Here then is the first

ingredient necessary for a feel for the dialectical:

logical

thought.
Socrates offers the best example of the second necessary ingredients

dialogue or conversation.

Here we are still
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concerned with logical thought, but now two individuals contribute to the attainment of the idea.
term for this

The more specific

ocratic type of dialectics is "maieutics."

Maieutic means "midwife.

Socrates acts as a midwife by

claiming ignorance and asking questions of a man.

By prodding

him to participate in the dialogue, the birth of the ideal
emerges from their activity together.

Socrates acts as the

negative input by asking questions in ignorance, and the other
party acts as the positive input by answering.

Logical

thought is still the result of Socratic dialogue.

It is as

if Socrates, in his questioning, contributes the blueprint.
The other party, in his answering, contributes the building
material.

In their maieutical dialogue, the structure of

logical thought is erected.

The emphasis is not on the con-

tent of the resulting thought as much as it is on the method
which produces the thought.
The most obvious characteristic of "the dialectical"
is that of movement.

The notion of dialectic always implies

movement, process, flux, development, or becoming.

Logic

has its own movement, as does dialogue, and in sensing this,
we are beginning to get a feel for "the dialectical. '
Hegel, this movement is of a specific kind.

For

He uses the

German word "aufheben" to describe the movement in logic.
Basically, "aufheben" connotes three very different actions:
to cancel, to preserve, and to elevate.

Only when all three

of these verbs are active do we arrive at the movement implied
in the term "aufheben."

A geometrical analogy may help to

clear up the seeming contradictions of the term "aufheben."

Imagine four points, A, B, C, and D, which represent four
ideas.

Point A is our premise, point D our conclusion and

we are interested in finding out their dialectical
relationship by employing the concept of "aufheben" to this schema
.
We begin with our premise, point A, and logica
lly move to
point B.

As we move, part of point A is cancelled or left

behind and yet part of point A is preserved and carrie
d, or
elevated, to point B.

Point B now has point A synthesized

within itself, so that point A is still present in point
B.
Point B is now cancelled, preserved, and elevated to
point C
so that points A and E are present in point C.

The movement

continues to point D which is the result of the cancel
lation,
the preservation, and the elevation of points A, B, and C.
Hence, the movement of "aufheben" is not merely a passin
g
through, but involves the ideas of incorporation, combination,
merging, blending, or synthesis.
This particular type of movement, characterized by
'aufheben," is not only applicable to logic and thought but
also to history.

Hegel, Marx, and Darwin all use this general

concept to analyze historical development.

For Hegel, history

is the account of the dialectical development of the Absolute
Spirit.

For Marx, history is the account of the dialectical

development of material goods and economic systems.

or

Darwin, history is the account of the dialectical evolution
of biological species.

It is easy to see how the concept of

"aufheben" can be applied to so many various disciplines.

In

addition to logical and historical dialectic, Kierkegaard also
developed a dialectic which concerns itself with existence.
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Kierkegaard saw existence as a becoming, a synthesizing movement whereby the individual actively relates himself to himself before God,

Existence is never static, but always

moving, blending all the aspects of the individual together
to form the character and quality of the person.

At this

point, some insight is given for the above quote concerning
existence.

Here "the dialectical" signifies this movement or

becoming as opposed to just logic.
As we continue our investigation of "the dialectical,"
we are confronted with yet another aspect of this complex
concept:

polarity.

This aspect is particularly present in

the maieutical or Socratic dialectic where Socrates is the
negative pole and the responder the positive.

Polarity is

also present in the "aufheben" of Hegel as seen in the fact
that the idea is both cancelled and preserved at the same
time.

In reading Kierkegaard, the ability to recognize when

he is establishing a polarity enables one tc sense the dialectical nature of his works.

Kierkegaard not only establishes

polarity in regard to his polemics against idealism, but
polarity is present throughout his thought.

For example, in

his anthropology, man is a synthesis of the infinite and the
finite; in his concept of worship, God is wholly other than
man; in his authorship, polarity is exemplified by Either/Or
and the entire dichotomy of the aesthetic and religious works.
Here insight is given to the above quote concerning his authorship where 'dialectical" implies this notion of polarity.
"The dialectical," as it is utilized by Kierkegaard,
connotes one more concept that relates most specifically to
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Socrates.

This is the concept of irony or inversion.

Socra-

tes always approached his dialogue from a position of irony
by claiming ignorance.

Kierkegaard also uses this type of

dialectics, especially in his book Philosophical Fragments.
The ironical aspect of "the dialectical" is more closely
associated with maieutics, but this notion of inversion seems
to be present apart from the maieutic method.

By inversion

I mean to identify that dialectical movement whereby a synonym
suddenly becomes an antonym.

This inversion is present in the

"aufheben" of Hegel where cancellation and preservation coincide
in elevation.

Yet Kierkegaard's usage of "the dialectical"

is by no means restricted to the Hegelian concept of "aufheben.
The dialectical inversion is exemplified by suffering being
joy, dying to the world to live unto God, becoming an isolated
individual in order to gain Christian fellowship.

Here some

insight is gained for the above quote concerning the God relationship.

The "dialectical" here seems to align itself

with this notion of inversion so that anguish and crisis is
at the same time blessedness.
In summary, the concept of "the dialectical" basically
signifies movement as qualified by the German term "aufheben."
More often than not, "the dialectical" concerns itself with
logical movement.

Along with this is the Socratic dialectic,

or maieutics, whereby "the dialectical" signifies the negative
questioning and positive answering of two persons who contribute to the movement of the idea.

Involved in "the dialecti-

cal" is the notion of polarity or opposites, and the notion
of irony or inversion.

It must always be remembered that

the dialectical" is never static.

The emphasis is not on

the conclusions drawn from logical activity, rather it is on
that activity itself which is described in the concept of
"the dialectical."

With this we have established a general

orientation in order to gain a feel for "the dialectical."
As our discussion continues, this concept will become clearer
and its importance in properly interpreting Kierkegaard will
continue to manifest itself.
The Philosophical Barriers to Christianity
It is not my purpose here to expound on the philosophical systems that Kierkegaard confronts, except to itemize and clarify the three major philosophical tendencies that
Kierkegaard's literature aims to correct.

Although much of

Kierkegaard's literature is aimed specifically at Hegelianism,
its function as a corrective authorship is by no means restricted solely to this context.

Kierkegaard has much to say

to the modern reader and to those philosophical systems which
have arisen since his death.
Pre -Hegelian philosophies are generally bifurcated
systems.

Leibuiz, Lessing, and especially Kant all view

philosophy as having two realms.

Kant titles these realms as

the Phenomenal and the Noumenal.

Here subjectivity, faith,

God, and morals are completely separated from objectivity,
reason, and science.

Post-Kantians, such as Fichte and

Schleiermacher, only serve to widen the gap between subjectivity and objectivity

But with the arrival of Hegel's ideal -

this gap is ostensibly closed and the unity of subjectivity
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and objectivity, faith and reason, Cod and man, logic and ontology is achieved.
Hegel performs this amazing feat of reconciliation
by means of the notion of the dialectical.

Before we center

on those three tendencies of idealism which Kierkegaard tries
to correct, it would be beneficial to briefly explain the
Hegelian system.

This system is founded on the notion that

everything - history, science, religion, empirical reality everything is involved and is necessary in the dialectical
self-unfolding of the Absolute Idea.

The Absolute Idea exists

in itself beyond time and space in logic.

It tnen unfolds

itself or becomes itself spatially in the philosophy of Nature
and temporally in the philosophy of History.

As the Absolute

moves through time and space, it comes to know itself and ultimately attains complete self-knowledge.
It is evident that Hegel's concept of the Absolute
is, in fact, his concept of God.

Hegel is convinced that the

development of the Absolute in religion has reached its pinnacle in the form of Christianity and that the Absolute's
development in philosophy has reached its pinnacle in the form
of Hegel's own Speculative Philosophy.

In fact, the only

difference between Hegel's philosophy and Christianity is in
form, not contents Christianity being the lower form.

Hegel

can relegate Christianity to Philosophy because, to him, God
is "Mind."

As Mind, God incorporates all things into himself,

both subjectivity and objectivity.

Subjective knowledge,

found in human thought, and objective knowledge, that which
is thought about (i.e. Nature), are both dialectically
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synthesized by Mind so that the Absolute includes itself in
its own object:

the synthesis of thought thinking itself.

But it can never be assumed that the Absolute is beyond this
dialectical synthesis of subjective and objective knowledge.
On the contrary, the Absolute only knows itself as this synthesis and Lts self-knowledge will only be complete when the
dialectic culminates in the "Kinrdom of God," when the synthesis will be so complete that the Absolute will be all in all,
when subjectivity and objectivity become identical.

Mean-

while, the Absolute is bound fast to the dialectical becoming
of space and time, and its self-consciousness is directly
related to humanity's consciousness, so that as generic man's
consciousness develops, so too the Absolute comes to know
itself.
To know what God as spirit is - to apprehend this
accurately and distinctly in thoughts - requires
careful and thorough speculation. It includes, in
its forefront, the propositions: God is God only so
far as he knows himself; his self-knowledge is,
further, a self-consciousness in man and man's
knowledge of God,owhich proceeds to man's selfknowledge in God.'
For Hegel, God is Mind and salvation lies in man's
ability to attain to Mind via speculative activity.

God is

not beyond creation, but identified in creation, particularly
in man's speculative consciousness.

By applying his abstract,

speculative dialectic, Hegel is able to mediate between logic
or reason, and ontology or Kant's "thing-in-itself."

Hegel's

famous dictum, "The real is the rational and the rational is
9rrederick Weiss, ed., Hegel: The Essential 4ritinks
(New York: Harper and Row, 19741-, p. 123.
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the real," aligns reality with speculation or Mind.
If there still appear to be antinomies and contradictions, that is only because the absolute idea is still in the
process of development.

These antinomies are only apparent

and will be resolved or synthesized as the Absolute comes
nearer to complete self-knowledge.

In Hegel's system, the

only truth is the truth of the dialectic.
static, revelation never complete.

Truth can never be

All is becoming Mind.

Hegel would be offended at Christ saying,

the Way, the

Truth, and the Life," because no man or no specific point of
history could embody truth.

Hegel does allow for the neces-

sity of history, but only as it is essential to the dialectical movement of Mind.
is superfluous.

Therefore, God's revelation in Christ

There can be nothing qualitatively new which

cannot be approached by speculative thought.

The law of

dialectical mediation necessarily implies that truth is inherent in the present world system and Christ saying that He
truth is just unnecessary.

By this we can see that Hegel

is the distant son of Plato and his idealism, because Hegel
also maintains that men possess truth and only need to be
reminded of it.

In fact, with the aid of the dialectical pro-

cess, man will eventually realize truth (self-knowledge) and
at that point man will, in fact, be God.
To summarize, Hegel sees speculative logic as being
equal with ontology, or material reality.

This equation is

established by the synthesizing movement of the dialectic.

By

applying the dialectic to history, religion, and philosophy,
Hegel is able to translate everything into the realm of
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speculation or Mind.

He is completely justified in so apply-

ing the dialectic because he is, in fact, an idealist and
views truth as inherent in the world's system, particularly
in man's ability to think.

From this brief description, we

can now bring to the fore the three tendencies of idealism
that Kierkegaard tries to correct.
All three tendencies, or barriers, originate in
Speculative Philosophy itself, and can be directly attributable to the notion of the dialectical utilized by Hegel.

The

first and most basic barrier to Christianity is the unification of logic with ontology.

This unification is achieved

by adopting the dialectical as the fundamental principle
which structures all creation.

Although this equation of

logic and ontology results from Hegel's dialectical method,
I am going to identify this union as being presuppositional
in Hegel's system, because all that folloles presupposes the
fact that "the rational is the real and the real is the
rational."

Kierkegaard does not view the dialectics of logic
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but rather it is to the
as being a barrier in itself,
assumptions or presuppositions of the logic that he addresses
himself.

If one allows Hegel his basic tenets, then it is

virtually impossible to resist the conclusions that Hegel
draws.

Therefore the battle must be waged at the root level

of presuppositions.

But Hegel tries to evade such a confron-

tation by maintaining that "We can assume nothing, and assert
10
Soren Kierkegaard, The Present A e, trans. Alexander
Dru (New Yorks Harper and Row, 196-2), P.

nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the assertions and
assumptions of others."11 The only reason Hegel is able to
say such a thing is because of his application of the dialectical; the assumptions are synthesized away into the "System."
Since the assumptions are unessential, the validity of the
conclusions also becomes suspect.

In fact, Hegel's System is

inherently open-ended, uncompleted, unsystematic.

"In a

scientific structure the absence of the conclusion has retroactive power to make the beginning doubtful and hypothetical,
which is to say: unsystematic..12 Even though Hegel will
not acknowledge his starting points, I am nevertheless going
to interpret this unity of logic with ontology as being pre suppositional in his thought.
If Hegelian philosophy has emancipated itself from
every presupposition, it has won this freedom by
means of one lunatic poulate: the initial transition to pure thought.1-,
What Kierkegaard here calls "initial" I am calling presuppositional.

The "transition" is the dialectical movement where-

by objective reality and reason are made identical.
thought" is the category of the Absolute Idea.

"Pure

In Hegelianism

all creation is absorbed into thought thinking itself.

Kierke-

gaard calls this "initial transition to pure thought" a
"lunatic postulate" because for Hegel to so adamantly claim
no assumptions and then to posit the identity of logic and
ontology is ironically comical to the poirc, of lunacy.
llweiss.

z
He el:

The Essential Writinga, p. 19.

12Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 17.
13Ibid., p. 279.
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The ramifications of equating logic and ontology are
far-reaching indeed.

For philosophy it means that the pre -

Hegelian bifurcations are no longer applicable.

The search

for Kant's "thing-in-itself" is no longer necessary because
the "thing-in-itself" is now identical with man's rational
conception of the world.

For religion it means that faith is

no longer sundered from reason, morality is no longer separated from logic.

For Christianity it means that revelation is

no longer irrational, Christ is no longer an object of faith
but verifiable by means of a rational, logical approach to
history.

Kierkegaard addressed much of his authorship to

correct this "lunatic postulate," because "one who has no
other presuppositions with which to make Christianity secure
except some Hegelian dialectic can readily go astray.

“14

The second barrier inherent in the "System" is the
notion of mediation.

Whereas the first barrier focused on

logic and ontology, this second barrier focuses on the equating or the movement whereby logic and ontology are joined.
The first barrier is basically a statement of fact'
equals ontology.

logic

The second barrier concerns itself with the

method or the "tow -to" aspect of idealism.

Hence, the notion

of mediation is synonymous with the notion of dialectics.
Mediation was present in the above discussion on
Hegel's system.

Because of mediation, man is seen as even-

tually coming into self-knowledge in God.

In other words, when

one holds to the notion of mediation, there is then no breach
in continuity between man and Cod.

This is the idea operative

4Kierkegaard, On Authority and Revelation, p. 81.
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in all forms of idealism whereby truth resides in man and he
need only be maieutically reminded of

t.

To Kierkegaard,

this notion of mediation constitute:3 what is actually paganism
because it is maintained that via mediation
related to Cod.15

man is directly

It should be remembered, though, that this

mediated relation to God is not ontological, for ontology has
been subsummed in logic and speculation.

Mediation is a

definite abstraction.
The obstacle presented by mediation is clarified in
relation to Kierkegaard's insistence that "the maximum of
attainment is simultaneously to sustain an absolute relationship to the absolute end, and a relative relationship to
relative ends."16 The notion of mediation allows the relative,
i.e. created order, to be confused with the absolute, i.e.
the order of the Creator.

Mediation, therefore, empties any

significance out of the absolute because it allows the absolute to be defined only in terms of the relative, i.e. that
which is being mediated.17
Mediation is a rebellion of the relative ends
against the majesty of the absolute, an attempt
to bring the absolute down to the level of everything else, an attack upon the dignity of human
life, seeking to make man a mere servant of relative ends. And in so far as it pretends to be
something higher than the nrsolute disjunction,
it is a fantastic fiction.i°

la • 219.

15
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
16
Ibid., p. 371.
1'Ibid., p. 363.
18Ibid., p. 375.

The third barrier to Christianity in the "System" is
the result of presupposing a mediation between logic and
ontology.

This barrier I call objectivity.

This is not the

same objectivity mentioned earlier in regard to Hegel's
Absolute incorporating both objective and subjective knowledge within itself.

This objectivity is related to that

Gnostic aspect of defining the total content of reality and
life by means of thought or reason.

The objective barrier

reLults in a complete overlooking of one's own personal existence, so that one does not define one's self subjectively in
terms of one's self, but rather in terms of an objective abstraction such as the State, the Church, or the public.

Hence,

the individual is lost in the crowd and consequently loses his
own personal existence.
Alas, while the speculative and worshipful Herr
Professor is engaged in explaining the whole of
existence, he has in distraction forgotten his
own name
namely, that he is a human bei , not
a fantastic three-eighths of a paragraph.
Because of the vast increase in knowledge and learning, the
individual has lost himself in abstractions and has "forgotten
what it means to exist, and what inwardness signifies. . 2O
This type of objectivity indeed serves as a barrier
to confronting one's own personal existence and the difficulties inherent in being one's self.

But objectivity is not a

barrier in the sense that it fights against subjectivity;
objectivity merely negates even the presence of a subjective
realm.

Objectivity does not even concern itself with subjec-

tive issues.
19Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 130.
2°Ibid., p. 216.
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The difficulty that inheres in existence, with which
the existing individual is confronted, is one that
never really comes to expression in the language
of abstract thought, much less receives an explanation. Because abstract thought is sub specie aeterni
it ignores the concrete and the temporal, the existential process, the predicament of the existing individual arising from his being a synthesis of the
temporal and the eternal situated in existence . . .
This definite something is just what abstract thought
abstracts from. But the difficulty lies in bringing
this definite something and the ideality of thought
together, by penetrating th^ concrete particularity
with thought. Abstract th, :ht cannot even take
cognizance of this contradiction, since the very
process of abW.action prevents the contradiction
from arising."Speculative Philosophy encourages this type of objectivity by demanding that one take a position of doubt or assumes a certain distance from life.
a spectator's stance toward life.

This can be called taking

From such a position, one

is then able to participate in the self -unfolding of the Absolute idea, but such participation is had only at the expense
of one's own existence.
The combination of equating logic with ontology,
utilizing the notion of mediation, and approaching life objectively, form what I call an abstract dialectic.

The problem

inherent in speculatively translating the whole of reality
into an abstract dialectic is that what is being translated
is lost in the act of translation.

The term "abstraction"

necessarily implies a relationship to a -concrete," but this
-concrete" is demolished in a speculative "system."

"The re-

lation which abstract thought still sustains to that from
2
1Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 267,

19
which it abstracts, is something which pure thought innocently
or thoughtlessly in pores .
02
phantom.

That is, pure thought is a

The Ecclesiastical Barriers to Christianity
Nineteenth century Danish society embraced Hegelianism
with open arms as the assumptions of Speculative Philosophy
were accepted and applied to all aspects of that culture.

The

average citizen of Copenhagen viewed himself as part of the
"Zeitgeist" and extrapolated himself into an abstract concept
of nationalism which aligned itself with Hegel's idea of
generic human self-knowledge.

The "man on the street" knew

himself only as belonging to the nation or the State which
was participating in this abstract dialectic of history.

Many

were convinced that they were, as a mass, involved in the
self-unfolding of the Hegelian Absolute Spirit.

In keeping

with this conviction, and because Hegelianism and Christianity
were seen as being identical, Danish society became known as
"Christendom."

This title, implying that all the people and

their social structure were, in fact, Christian, is not surprising

onsidering their Hegelian orientation.

After all, if

Hegelianism has the same content as Christianity, and the
society defined itself from Hegelian presuppositions, then
there is nothing illogical in labeling the society "Christendom."
But those barriers that Kierkegaard intends to correct
are not relevant only in the context of Hegelianism; they can
22
Kierkegaard, Concludinr Unscientific Postscript,
p. 278.
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and do appear even in our contemporary society.

Those ob-

stacles can appear in a theological idealism and they are a
reiteration of the transition to pure thought, the notion of
mediation, and a speculative objectivity whereby Christianity
is defined solely in terms of a doctrinal construct.

It is

in this area of theological idealism that Kierkegaard's concern as a corrective centers.

Kierkegaard's constant concern

is with the "religious"23 and his criticisms of philosophy are
necessitated only because the "religious" so readily accepted
the philosophical.

Kierkegaard's objective as a corrective

is to direct the attention of those in Christendom away from
the doctrines of Christianity.

This is not to imply that

Christianity has no doctrines and is therefore contentless.
To say that would be a "chicane."24

Rather, the intent is to

direct the reader's attention to his 'relationship to such a
2)
doctrine.
In an age where the doctrinal content of Christianity
is well known to most, it becomes all too easy to know what
Christianity is without oneself being a Christian.26

In fact,

"the situation has been so inverted that one is interested in
Christianity in order to know what Christianity is, not interested in knowing what Christianity is in order to be a
23Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 5.
24Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
339-340.
PP•
25
Ibid., p. 19.
26
Ib1d., p. 332.
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Christian."27

Here we can see evidence of the barrier of

objectivity where revelation is approached in a speculative
or academic manner and the desire to live Christ-like or to
be a Christian is absent.

Thi7 inverted situation results in

revelation being confused with its speculative interpretation,
so that theological idealism does not understand Christianity
as the truth, but understands its interpretation of Christianity as the truth.

In so doing, theological idealism makes its

own speculations the content of its knowledge rather than deriving its content from Christianity.28

Kierkegaard's inten-

tion is to clarify Christianity, but not doctrinally.

Such

clarification would only result in another bit of knowledge
which would arouse nobody's attention.

Rather, as a correc-

tive, the clarification is existential, clarifying what it is
to be a Christian.
The doctrinal content is not the area which needs correcting.
sented.

Rather, it is the way in which that content is preThe presentation of the Christian doctrines have be-

come so infiltrated with tne tenets of idealism that Kierkegaard has no other choice but to focus on the "hows" of
Christianity and not the "whats."

It is the way in which one

becomes a Christian and lives as a Christian which concerns
Kierkegaard, not the ability to recite the Apostles' Creed or
a certain quantity of Bible verses.

If the "hows" are lost

for the sake of the "whats" then it is very possible that
27
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscris
.I,
p. 541.
28

Ibid., p. 200.

the 'whets" are become suspect as well.
For it is not true that doctrine remains the same
whoever the teacher. For in one case the proclamation of doctrine is truth and certifies itself as
such through its proclamation; in another case the
manner of the proclamation turns the doctrine into
untruth; R9 that the doctrine does not really remain
the same.4
Presenting Christianity in an objective, academic
fashion is only one result of the infiltration of an abstract
dialectic into theology.

The tendency to view Christianity

as the result of an historical development is another which
relates to the objectivity barrier and the mediation barrier.
The nineteenth century Danish Church officials tend to sanction their activities with idealistic rationale as opposed
to the New Testament.

This allows the notion of historical

credence to gain a very strong influence in the minds of the
congregation.

The extent to which this concept of the his-

torical penetrated the nineteenth century Dane is probably
something completely foreign to us living in twentieth century
America.

Possibly the closest historical analogy would be the

notion of the Aryan race of Nazi Germany.

This type of in-

fluence can only take hold where there is a strong sense of
nationalism and where "culture" signifies almost the same
thing as "religion."

This is what happens in the nineteenth

century Danish Church allowing it to find its purpose in
history and national development.
The notion of mediation is at once recognizable in
identifying the Church with mere historical development.

But

29
Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence,
trans. Harold Knight (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), p. l.
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as we have seen, mediation is a rebellion of relative ends
against absolute ends which, in this case, results in the
relativizing of God.

Rather than deriving its identity from

the absolute God, the Church instead relativizes God by seeking its identification in history.
Christianity is not content to be an evolution
within the total definition of human natures such
an offer is too trifling a one to propose to the
Deity, who does not want to be at one moment for
the believer the paradox, and then little by little
to supply him with an understandings for the martyrdom
of faith (crucifixion of the understanding) is not a
martyrdom of he instant but precisely the martyrdom
of endurance.,
u
The ramifications of operating by a notion of mediation are
the same for theology as they are for philosophys
presuppositions and the telos are mediated away.31

both the
Mediation,

for the Church, ultimately means that its beginning (i.e.
Christ) and its end (i.e. the Kingdom of God) are confusingly
hidden and eventually lost in the movement of history.
Mediation is also relevant when we talk about the difference between worship and superstition.

Worship stems from

realizing the absolute difference between God and man.

If

this difference is not presupposed in one's God -relationship,
then any immediate relationship is actually "impertinence,
frivolity, effrontery, and the like.,,32

3Nierkegaard,
•
Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 496.
31Ibid., pp. 337-338.
p. 369.
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Precisely because there is an absolute difference
between God and man, man will express his own nature
most adequately when he expresses this difference
absolutely. Worship is the maximum expression for the
God -relationship of a human being, and hence also for
his likeness with God, because the qualities are absolutely different. But the significance of worship
Is, that God is absolutely all for the worshipper;
and the worshipper jji again one who makes the absolute distinction.'
,
In worship, mediation has no place, for the notion of media34
tion makes for a pagan setting.

And, as in any pagan set-

ting, superstition becomes the norm.

Superstition is that

form of religious expression whereby man is brought into an
Immediate relationship to the numinous.35

Mediation encourag-

es superstition which is, in fact, the deification of the
36
created system.

The Church, by mediating generic man to

its notion of God, engages in acts of superstition.

What is

necessary to overcome superstition, is to recognize the absolute difference between God and man.

Kierkegaard's pseudo-

nym, Johannes Climacus, calls this difference a "breach."
This is a direct assault on the notion of mediation.

"The

immediate relationship to God is paganism, and only after the
breach has taken place can there be any question of a true
God -relationship.

But this breach is precisely the first act

of inwardness in the direction of determining the truth as
inwardness."37
33Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
p. 369.
Ibid., p. 219.
35Ibid.
36
Soren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, trans.
Walter Lowrie (Princeton, N.J.I tirinceton University Presq,
1944), pp. 88-89.
37Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.219.
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What Climacus is attempting to do with his concept of
a 'breach" is to confront the reader with the doctrine of sin.
Sin is what causes the separation between God and man.

In an

abstract dialectic which utilizes a notion of mediation, man
can never be classified as being depraved, as being a sinner.
The word "sin" to the speculative theologian merely signifies
a lack or incomplete development which will be compensated for
in time.

Here is possibly the most damaging consequence of

mediations

the inability to cognize oneself as a sinner before

God.
The influence of the notion of mediation is evident
in the objective interest displayed toward Christianity, the
identification of the Church in historical development, the
superstitious form of worship, and the neglect of the doctrine
of sin.

This orientation only results in yet more obstacles

to Christianity, and ironically they arise in the Church itself.

What happens is the practices of the Church become

trivialized and spiritually meaningless.

The clergy is per-

haps the most responsible for such trivialization of the
Church's functions, and the clergymen themselves serve as
obstacles to the reception of Christianity.

A clergyman is

an obstacle when his life does not adhere to the sermons that
he proclaims.

This is a comic situation, but comedy, to

Kierkegaard, is a very serious thing.

The comedy resides in

the contradiction of the clergy's hypocrisy.

The comic clergy-

man is one who opts for speculative religion as opposed to
living as a Christian.38

Kierkegaard, in his essay "Becoming

38Kierkeraard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
p. 500.
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Sober," describes the candidate in theology who makes a
mockery of "seek ye first the kingdom of God" (Matt. 6133).
Christ's words are mocked as the candidate is described as
seeking acclaim, and then the comedy appears when the candidate then preaches on Matt. 6:33.39

Here is seen an example

of the Church's misuse of the authority of the clergyman who
by his neglect of his own personal existence empties all
meaning from the imperative "seek ye."
Not only does the life of such a clergyman trivialize
the Church, but the religious address that he delivers will
also conclude with the same result.

The sermon and its de-

livery, in such a setting, can also become barriers to the
reception of Christianity.

Sermons which avoid man's sinful

condition and his responsibility before God
easily become ornamental.

can all too

The problem of such sermons is

that, as mediation would dictate, they deal solely in relative
ends.

As a result, the congregation values only relative

things.

Imagine the sermon being delivered in a magnificently

elaborate church, with hymns brilliantly arranged and performed.

The sermon itself is given with oratory excellence,

rising and falling in tempo and tone and all the while
following the most concise logical progression until the
final note on the organ is played.

The congregation files

out with their heads full of adjectives such as "beautiful."
"awesome," 'moving" and the like.
tion?

But where is the edifica-

Where is the challenge to living ethically before an

39cJ
.oren Kierkegaard,
For Self-Examination and Judge
for Yourselves, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, N.J.
Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 126-127.
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omnipotent and holy God?

With no emphasis on such things,

the sermon itself can only serve as a barrier to Christianity.
To Kierkegaard, the religious address must always confront
the hearer with the absolute ramifications cf existing before
an absolutely holy God.40

An essential aspect of a religious

address should be the importance and necessity of sufferinp,
i.e. existing as a sinner before God.41

To include these

aspects into one's sermon by no means limits the topics that
one can present.

The addresser has at his disposal

any particular, whatever it may be, but wnat distinguishes the religious address as such is that from
this particular it gets at the total determinant by
putting it together with the relationship to an eternal blessedness . . . but a religious address has to
do with inwardness, where the total determinant grips
a man. The total determinant is the religious
characteristic, everything else, if it is lacking in
this, is essentially an illusion, according to which
even the greatest criminal is after all inwent at
bottom, and a good-natured man is a saint."'`
The sermon which lacks the "total determinant," i.e.
man as ethically responsible before God, allows the notion of
mediation to come into play and man then superstitiously feels
himself related to God and, in turn, then gives aesthetically
oriented applause to the comic clergyman.

If aesthetically

oriented applause is the only way the congregation reacts to
the sermon, then the clergyman would do best to relinquish his
position to a poet, for a poet is far more deserving of aesthetic applause and would receive even more applause, thereby
4
°Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
PP. 382-3e3.
41
Ibid., p. 390.
4"Ibid., pp. 278-279.
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becoming an even better clergyman.

In fact, the congrega-

tion would appreciate this aesthetic increase for it only confirms to them what they already suspected:
authority or meaning in the sermon.

there is no

The parson can rant and

rave, pound the pulpit and cry real tears, but the congregation will only applaud and comment to each other on how well
44
their pastor earns his living.
This tendency to qualify the religious in aesthetic
terms means That Christianity has become trivialized to a
relative value system.

If Christianity is the absolute, as

Kierkegaard maintains, the trivialization of it is the most
serious depreciation, "for the most ludicrous thing that can
ever happen to Christianity is to be identified with trivial
use and wont." 5 "With regard to Christianity, there is nothing
46
to which every man is more inclined than to take it in va5n."
The religious address is an example of trivialized
Christianity and the rite of baptism is another.

Kierkegaard

criticizes the Church's use of baptism, not the doctrine.
The rite of baptism, in Kierkegaard's day, was issued to a
child at the age cf two weeks.

At this point the child re-

ceives a certificate which becomes valid proof of membership
43Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
P. 391.
44Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination and Judge for
Yourselves, p. 139.
45Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
P. 325.
Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination and Judge for
"
Yourselves, p. Q5.

to the Church and evidence of Christianity.

The aspect of

personal appropriation is thereby completely neglected and
almost as soon as one is born, one becomes Christian, "so
that in the end to be a Christian and to be a man are identical.

Kierkegaard is by no means opposed to baptism;

rather he is opposed to the trivial use of it and its being
referred to as proof of one's Christianity.

In Concluding

Unscientific Postscript, Climacus humorously describes the
"future judgement" as a "scene in a passport office" where
the dead scurry about waving their certificates of baptism
as security for admission.

Again it is evident that the rite

of baptism can become superstitiously applied, and all superstition is evidence of paganism.

"Speculative philosophy

deduces paganism logically from Christianity, and the fact
that people become Christians merely through being baptized
transforms Christendom into a baptized paganism.

”48

The upshot of the trivialization of Christianity is
that to be a Christian becomes the easiest of all things to
be; almost as easy as being born.

In nineteenth century Copen-

hagen, grace is cheap and easily bestowed just because one
happens to be born at such a time in such a place.

But

Kierkegaard knows better. He knows that God's grace is so expensive that it cost the life of God Himself as Jesus Christ.
The obstacle here is that Christianity is made easy and this
47
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 328.
48

Ibid., p. 329.
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results from the Church speculatively relating itself to
Christ's exaltation and forthcoming loftiness rather than
taking upon itself His humiliation and lowliness."

It is

against this background that Climacus says. "My purpose is to
make it difficult to become a Christian."6°
The Cultural Barriers to Christianity
The influence of philosophical and theological idealism is evidenced in yet another area: that of a cultural or
societal form of idealism.

Kierkegaard views idealistic cul-

ture or society itself as an obstacle to the reception of
Christianity and he places a large portion of the blame for
such hindrance on Christendom itself.
Yes, indeed one is so ready (and this doubtless is
the way to become the darling of the Christian public), so ready to lay the blame on the preachers of
Christianity, to seek the defect in them; and yet
perhaps it is rather the Christian public which would
compel the preachers by the fear of men (to which
certainly the preachers dare not yield) to deceive
this Christian public . . . For the world wants to be
deceived; it not only is deceived (ah, then the thing
would not be so dangerous), but it wants to be deoeived; vehemently, more vehemently perhaps than any
'witness' has struggled for the truth, the world
struggles to be deceived, and gratefully it rewards,
with money, with prestige, everyone,yho wants to do
what it wants, wants to deceive it. -71
The barrier most dominant in such an idealistic society
is that of objectivity.

The prevalance and priority placed

49
Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, pp. 204-205.
50Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 495.
cl .
-- K l erkegaard, For Self-Examination and Judge for
Yourselves, pp. 153-154.

31
on erudition results in an age"of understanding and reflection, without passion."

52

In such a condition, the life anc

vitality of the society is absent because "an age without
passion has no values, and everything is transformed into
representational ideas."53
The passionless society has a tendency to approach
issues in a passive, apprehensive manner.

Any issues that are

dealt with are done so in more of an academic fashion than
in any real concrete manner.

As such, reflection supersedes

action so that any real decision concerning a societal issue
is lost in the mere "possibility of reflection."54

All

effort can be exerted in merely analyzing the situation,
thereby leaving no impetus for action.
Yet, when action occurs, it is given its rationale by
some "catch-all" phrase.

These phrases can be derived from

idealism itself and be perpetrated through "advertisement
and publicity."55

Slogans, such as Kant's categorical im-

perative, can be translated into principles for action, but
"'on principle' one can do anything and what one does, fundamentally, is a matter of indifference."56
responsibility is ignored.-7

Obviously, morality then loses

52Kierkegaard, The Present Ace, P53Ib1d., p. 40.
Ibid., p. 48.
55Ibid., p.

35.

561bid., p. 74.
57Ib1d., p.

75.
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all meaning.

Not that an ape acting "on principle

moral, but rather, amoral.

is im-

Ylorality becomes an ambiguity

relegated to reflection as opposed to action.53
The tendency to objectivity is also the tendency to
abstractions.

An idealistic society, such as Kierkegaard's,

tends to operate and identify itself in abstract terms.

The

most prominent abstraction has to do with a mass consciousness, a "Zietgeist." or public opinion.
In order that everything should be reduced to the
same level, it is first of allnecessary to procure a
phantom, its spirit, a monstrous abstraction, an
all embracing something which is nothing, a mirage
and that phantom is the pub11c.59
Kierkegaard calls this process of abstracting
"leveling."
versation.

Such a process empties meaning from common conThe "man on the street" begins to sanction his

life by "the public" and other completely objective abstractions which, when scrutinized, are so nebulous that no real
meaning or definition can be given them.

In a conversation

with our "man on the street," it becomes difficult to tell
when he is offering his personal opinion or merely reiterating a phrase derived from some abstraction.

Kierkepaard says

that after talking to such a man, one would get the "impression of having talked to an anonymity. .60
People's remarks are so objective, so all-inclusive,
that it is a matter of complete indifference who expresses them, and where human speech is concerned, that
is the same as acting "on principle." And sp our talk
becomes like the public, a pure abstraction.°1
5eKierkegaard, The Present Age, P. 43.
59Ibid., p. 59.

60Ibid.,
61
Ibid.

p. 77.
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Kierkepaard accuses the members of Christendom of
living in aesthetic categories.62 The tendency to objectivity,
to speculatively distancing one's self from action or ethics
by taking on a "third party (an onlooker)"63 role, is one of
tne aspects of aesthetic living.

A society that exemplifies

this tendency is obviously not conducive to individuality.
The indiviival can only be lost in his generation, or the
crowd.64 Individuality has no significance in a society that
identifies itself by some "Zeitgeist."

As a corrective,

Kierkegaard battles to validate the category of the individual
in order to overcome the objective barrier which is constantly
confronted in Christendom.

Individuality is not Christianity,

but in such a societal setting, it is certainly a step in the
right direction.

6

2Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 25.

"Kierkegaard, Present Age, p. 64.
64Ibid., p. 52.

CHAPTER II
MAIEUTIC METHCD
The Author
The intent of this paper is to classify Kierkepaard
as a corrective

not a philosopher, not a theologian, but a

thinker who undertakes the task of challenging those who would
too readily call themselves Christians.

Kierkepaard calls

himself a peculiar poet in the sense that he is also equipped
with such immense intellectual capacity.

As a corrective,

Kierkepaard has to do battle with those tendencies of idealism
which we discussed in the previous section.

Kierkegaard uses

the word "disobedience" to diagnose the problem of his age.
For the misfortune of our age - in the political as
well as in the religious sphere, and in all things is disobedience, unwillingness to obey. And one deceives oneself and others by wishing to make us imagine
that it is doubt. No, it is insubordination: it is
not doubt of religious truth but insubordination against
religious authority which is the fault in our misfortune and the cause of it. But, dialectically, insubordination has two formss
either wishing to be a
Feverback or wishing willfully to be an apostle. Disobedience is the secret of the religious confusion of
our age. This same spirit of disobedience is also . . .
at the basis of that which is the fundamental evil of
modern Speculation, the fact that men have confused the
spheres, confounded profundity of mind with authority,
the intellectual and the ethical, the notion,of being
a genius and the notion of being an apostle.°5
The Church of Kierkegaard's day, characteristically
focuses on the intellectual.

When the Church confronts a

6C

-Kierkegaard, On Authority and Revelation, p. liv.
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rejection, that rejection is generally categorized under the
heading of doubt.

This is not surprising since doubt is an

activity of one's intellect.

The Church's prognosis is to

provide proofs or establish logical validity, thereby overcoming doubt.

Once doubt is removed, faith is assumed, and

the transition is made from doubt to Christianity.

But

Kierkegaard views this approach as stemming from pagan assumptions.

Doubt is only a deficiency of mind, a lack, a state

of incompletion.

Once doubt is removed, the notion of media-

tion again becomes a factor, and without any real breach in
what it is to be a man, one simply accepts some previously
doubted dogma and labels oneself "Christian."

Kierkegaard

cannot stand such a serious condition as sin to be flippantly
trivialized into mere doubt.

The barrier to Christianity is

not doubt but sin, and sin is not relegated to one aspect of
a man's personality (i.e. intellect), but involves the total
man.

Sin can best be described as disobedience.

When one

disobeys, it is the result of the activity of one's total
personality - one's feelings, knowledge, will and imagination.
Therefore, in order to correct disobedience, one must be dealt
with in a total fashion.

Every aspect of one's personhood

must be brought into confrontation with the authority that
demands obedience.
Such a confrontation, especially in an idealistic
setting, can only be made by men with the intellectual caliber
of Soren Kierkegaard.

In fact, the society, valuing erudition

and intellectual acumen, demands those very qualities of anyone
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who would challenge and criticize it.

Kierkegaard is high-

ly qualified having "the presuppositions of his age constantly
at his service, in a highly eminent degree" and having

at

his disposal that which is the conspicuous mark of (his) age:
reflection and intelligence."67

It is Kierkegaard's inten-

tion to use his intellectual genius to correct those tendencies
which cause barriers to the reception of Christianity in his
"But it must always be remembered that reflection is

society.

not in itself something harmful, that, on the contrary, it is
necessary to work through it in order that one's actions should

68

be more intensive."

The problem then is religious disobedi-

ence resulting from the lack of "religious education (undersense).”69 In
standing this word in the broadest and deepest
this, Kierkegaard is not opting for more education in the
intellectual sense, but rather for a "how to" education, an
education which instructs in how to be religious.
Kierkegaard dedicates himself to precisely that goal
and he therefore assumes the role of a corrective.
The description 'corrective' implies something relative, as when we say 'here' or 'there,' right' or
'left.' Anyone who wishes to supply the corrective,
must carefully and deeply study the weakness of the
official version, putting forward the opposite view as
one-sidedly as possible, and as correctly as possible.
It is just in so doing that correction lies, and in
this, too, that the resignation of the corrector consists. For correction is thus in a sense freely
66

Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 3^.
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68Kierkegaard, The Present Are, p. 84.
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bestowed. when this work has been correctly done,
there may come along a man of supposedly acute mind
and object that the corrective is one-sided - and then
bring the public to believe that there is something
in what he says. Good heavens! Nothing is easier
than for the one who supplies the correction to set
down also the other side of the matter; in so doing,
however, he would cease to be the critic .4pd would
identify himself with what he criticises.'
Kierkegaard has the ability to expound an idealistic dialectic
comparable with a full-fledged idealist.

Such is the pre-

requisite of a corrective to idealism.
The activity of Kierkegaard as an author is more than
just a joust with idealism.

As a nineteenth century correc-

tive, idealism must be contended with, but the foundation and
overall intent of Kierkegaard's works lies at a deeper level
than mere philosophical debate.

Kierkegaard labels himself

as a "religious author" who deals with "what it means to become
a Christian."

As such, Kierkegaard has much to say to us in

1979.
The contents of this little book affirm, then, what
I truly am as an author. that I am and was a religious
author, that the whole of my work as an author is
related to Christianity, to the problem 'of becoming
a Christian,' with a direct or indirect polemic against
the monstrous illusion we call Christendom, or against
the illusion that in §vch a land as ours all are
Christians of a sort."
Once and for all I must earnestly beg the kind reader
always to bear in mente that the thought behind the 70
whole work Is; what it means to become a Christian.
70
Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence,
trans. Harold Knight (London; Oliver and Boyd, 1959), p.
71
Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 5.
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It is necessary for Kierkegaard to defend his religiousness
as an author because of the various literary forms in which
he expresses himself.

Even though much of Kierxegaard's

fame has stemmed from the popularity of his aesthetic works,
the "kind reader" cannot ignore the fact that religious works
are simultaneously offered, and these works present topics
closer to Kierkegaard's heart than the aesthetic works.
Supposing that such a reader understands perfectly and
appraises critically the individual aesthetic productions, he will nevertheless totally misunderstand me,
in as much as he does not understand thg religious
totality in my whole work as an author.(3
Kierkegaard calls himself a religious author not only
because of the religious content and intent of his works, but
also because he views his literary activity as an obedient
response to the role that God has enabled him to perform.
From the very beginning I have been as it were under
arrest and every instant have sensed that it was not
I that played the part of master, but that another
was Master. I have sensed that fact with fear and
trembling when He let me feel His omnipotence and my
nothingness; have sensed it with indescribable bliss
when I turnpd to Him and did my work in unconditional
obedience:74
Kierkegaard qualifies this involvement of "Governance" in his
authorship by maintaining that he claims no immediate relationship with God; that God does not insert thoughts into his mind
to be included in his works.

Rather. Kierkegaard's relation-

ship to God is a "reflection-relationship" whereby he uses his
intellectual genius in submission to God's revelation.75
73Kierkegaard, Point of View, p• c•
74
Ibid., p. 69.
5Ibid., pp. 68-69.
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can only beg the reader not to think of revelations or anything of that sort, for with me everything is dialectical."76
In other words, Kierkegaard reflects on the revelation given
in Scripture, rather than claiming to have something new to
say.

His book On Authority and Revelation brings this issue

to the fore.

In this work, Kierkegaard uses the situation

cf a contemporary priest named Adler, who claimed a direct
revelation from Christ, to show the difference between an
apostle and a genius.

By claiming such a revelation, Adler

assumes the role of an apostle, thereby qualifying his works
as something new, something in addition to Scripture.

Kierke-

gaard attacks Adler's credentials and his contradictions in
making such a claim, and in so doing, qualifies himself as a
genius who operates in a "reflection-relationship" to God.
In On Authority and Revelation Kierkegaard develops
another polemic which sheds more light on his self-image as
an author.

The contrast is made between an "essential author"

and a "premise author."

Kierkegaard is an essential author.

Adler is a premise author, who writes from the premise of a
revelation from Christ.

The premise author is necessarily

open-ended, because he is subject to the possibility that
another premise may arise and supersede the initial premise.
An essential author does not operate with such uncertainty.
Rather, he follows "a definite world-view and life-view" which
is established in himself prior to his literary productions.
"Be it much or little the essential author has hitherto
76Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 83.

CORRECTION

PRECEDING /MA GE HAS BEEN
REFILMED
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY OR TO
CORRECT A POSSIBLE ERROR
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understood by his world-view, he explains only what he has
understood; he does not wait superstitiously for something
from the outside to turn up suddenly and bring him to an understanding. instruct him suddenly what he really wills."77
Kierkegaard operates from his own world-view which is defined
in terms of God's revelation.

His genius enables him to

gain an understanding necessary to explain that world-view.
Without this understanding, it would be best to remain
silent.78
As an essential author, Kierkegaard follows a worldview which is definitely religious

His authorship is a

service to God having as its purpose the correction and clarification of what it is to become a Christian.

The world-view

offered by Kierkegaard is established and limited by God's
revelation.

"It is true that Christianity is built upon a

revelation, but also it is limited by the definite revelation
it has received."I9

Because of his goal to clarify what it

is to become a Christian, Kierkegaard ultimately points to
that revelation given of God in Christ.

For Kierkegaard,

this revelation is objectively given by God, not subjectively
contrived by himself as an essential author.
Christianity exists before any Christian exists,
it must exist in order that one may become a
Christian, it contains the determinant by which one
may test whether one has become a Christian, it
maintains its objective subsistence apart from all
77Kierkegaard, On Authority and Revelation, p. 7.
78Ibid., p. 9.
79
Ibid., p. 92,
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believers, while at the same time it is in the inwardness of the believer. In short, here there is no
identity between the subjective and the objective . .
even if no one had perceived that God had revealed
himself in a human form in Christ, he nevertheless has
revealed himself. Hence it is that every ccntemporary
(simply understop0) has a responsibility if he does
not perceive it.°u
In his authorship, Kierkegaard intends to confro
nt the reader
with the objective revelation of God, particularly
that
revelation in Christ.
religious writer.

These intentions can only belong to a

As a corrective, functioning with a maieu-

tical method, Kierkegaard can only present this
world-view to
the reader without pressuring him to be persuaded
one way or
the other.

-Yea, though what he has to proclaim were never to

prevail in the world, to this he might reply, 'All the
worse
,8l
for the world.

The Author's Method
In our discussion of the concept of the dialectical,
the Socratic method of maieutics was introduced.

Socratic

maieutics is the method which Kierkegaard patterns his method
from.

Socrates is interested in maieutically extracting the

universal idea of manishness from the individual
in conversation.

The individual claims to be a man.

ignorance of what it is to be a man.

Socrates claims

By questions. Socrates

indirectly allows the individual to define manishness for
himself.

Once this definition is arrived at, the individual is

then in the situation to perceive the difference betwee
n
that definition and his own existence as a man.

The outcome

RO
Kierkepaard, On Authority and Revelation. pp. 168-169.
3lIbid., p. 44.

of such a perception would hopefully be a renewed effort on
the part of that individual, and Socrates, to become a man
patterned after the definition of manishness which surfaced
because of the maieutics of Socrates.
in Kierkepaard.

A parallel can be seen

The individual claims to be a Christian;

Kierkegaard, pseudonymously, claims ignorance in Christianity,
hoping to maieutically arrive at the point where the individual would perceive the difference between his existence
and the ideal Christian existence:

Christ's.

Kierkepaard's

intent is solely one of edification; hoping to stimulate the
individual to become concerned about actually

Ilting

(or

becoming) a Christian.
An understanding of Socratic maieutics is essential
to understanding Kierkegaardian maieutics.

Socrates utilizes

maieutics with the intent of allowing thought to emerge
into its objectivity.

Socrates assumes that truth lies hid-

den in each individual man, and he feels that by approaching
a man with questions, that ideal truth would emerge through
that man's responses.

In this, Socrates merely acts as a

"midwife." as an occasion to allow the individual to 'recollect
himself, i.e. the truth.

Socrates questions as a negative in-

fluence which interplays with the positive responses of the
individual.

The intended result is that by the dialectical

movement between these positive and negative inputs, the
eternal idea would emerge.

In face of the eternal idea, the

individual would then realize his inherent obligation to it,
and the degree to which he fulfills that obligation constitutes
his existence.

Hence, the Socratic dictum of "know thyself"

becomes the focus of Socrates

attention.

In "recollection"

the individual establishes nis existence, and existence is
the "sunum bonum" of the Socratic ethic.
The assumption that Socrates starts from is that he
is ignorant, that he knows nothing.
of Socratic irony.

Herein lies the source

He approaches an individual saying some-

thing like, "I do not know anything.
myself as a man.

I do not even know

Tell me, what is man?"

The individual would

obviously have some sort of response for he inherently knows
that he is a man.

So the dialogue ensues and the eternal

ideal of manishness emerges.

In this process both the indi-

vidual and Socrates can learn from each other.

4hat Socrates

encourages is an inquiry not so much concerning what it is to
be a man, but how one is to be a man.

Socrates is con-

cerned to incite passion and interest from the individual in
face of the eternal idea.

But Socrates does not go beyond

the establishment of the idea.

To him the idea marks the

limit of his speculative dialectical questioning.
define the pure idea itself.

He cannot

"Socrates had no knowledge of

that which lies at the ultimate ground of all things, he knew
that it was, but he did not know what it was: he was aware
of it, and yet he was not aware of it, inasmuch as the only
thing which he could say about it was that he knew nothing of
82
it."

Irony is again present in that what Socrates is striv-

ing for is actually a void.

The irony is that the striving

attains to nothing of any real content, but. ironically,
82,.
Olem, Kierkepaard's Dialectic of Existence, p. 47,
Ironie,
p. 178.
quoting

one should strive nonetheless.
Socrates sought:
tion.

This then is the truth that

the truth which lies in continual aspira-

One is true to oneself and knows oneself only in per-

sistent development in the face of the eternal idea.

In

spite of the fact that the eternal idea has no objective certainty, the ethical thing is to enter into a relationship to
it nonetheless.
Kierkegaard adapts the Socratic maieutic method into
his own approach to "that individual. -

Kierkegaard calls this

type of approach "indirect communication."

He feels it is

necessary to approach Christendom indirectly because of the
"illusion" that men are already Christians of a sort.

"No,

an illusion can never be destroyed directly, and only by
indirect means can it be radically removed .

.

That .i.s,

one must approach from behind the person who is under an 11lusion."83

A direct approach is appropriate when the situa-

tion is one of obvious paganism, such as by a missionary or
an evangelist.

But when the situation is one where the

audience already conceive themselves as Christian, to say
"No, you're not Christian," would only cause resentment and
actually fortify them in their misconception.84

Kierkegaard

views his pseudonymous writings as an approach "from behind,"
a "deception."

He feels that as an author, he can deceive

people in this fashion "for the truth's sake, and (to recall
Pr
old Socrates) one can deceive a person into the truth.
83Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 24.
84Ibid., p. 25.
p. 41.
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"The deception consists in the fact that one talks thus merely to get to the religious theme. ,R6 Kierkegaard rephrases
his intent by saying he wants "to wound from behind - for
edification.
By means of the pseudonyms, Kierkegaard, as Socrates,
approaches the individual in a negative or indirect manner.
Johannes Climacus is probably the best example of the Socrati
c
method.

Climacus claims to know what Christianity is but he

qualifies himself by stating that he is certainly not a
Christian.

He approaches the reader Socratically saying

"I know nothing of what it is to be a Christian, but tell me,
are you a Christian?"

In the final paragraph of the preface

to Philosophical Fragments, Climacus tells the reader that
he
has "no opinion" concerning the matter, he's just doing a
- nimble dancing in the service of Thought."
with the Socratic assumption of ignorance.

This corresponds
In the introduc-

tion to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus says,
"How may I, Johannes Climacus, participate in the happiness
promised by Christianity?

The problem concerns myself alone;

. . because, if it is properly posed, it will concern everyone else in the same manner."

This corresponds to that aspect

of maieutics whereby the questioner and the answerer both
learn from the dialogue.

In fact, Kierkegaard feels that

through his authorship, "Governance" had educated him, so
that as he writes to "that Individual," he also writes to
himself."

86Kierke

gaard, Point of View, p. 41.
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I am he who himself has been educated, or whose
authorship expresses what it is to be educated to the
point of becoming a Christian. In the fact that education is pressed on me, and in the measure that it is
pressed, I press in turn upon ts age; but I am not a
teacher, only a fellow student.°°
That Kierkegaard takes a Socratic stance as an author
is evidenced in his refusal to place any judgement on his
reader.89

Judgement is absent because each individual is

responsible for his own existence and the qualities incorporated therein.

Since all men can become individuals, the

quantitative differences between men vanish when the task is
to exist individually.90

As a corrective, approaching in-

directly from behind, Kierkegaard cannot pronounce judgement.
The only result such an approach can have on a man is to attract his attention to the quality of his existence.

Judge-

ment comes into play only after the man has participated in
the authorship.

Then it is he who must judge for himself as

to the quality of his existence.
In all eternity it is impossible for me to compel
a person to accept an opinion, a conviction, a
belief. But one thing I can do: I can compel him
to take notice . . . By obliging a man to take
notice I achieve the aim of obliging him to judge,
Now he is about tg judge - but how he judges is not
under my control.Y1
The very maximum of what one human being can do for
another in relation to that wherein each man has to
do solely with hiTself, is to inspire him with concern and unrest.'Y'
88Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 75.
"Ibid., pp. 26-27.
"Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 442.
91Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 35.
92Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 346.
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Once the reader has been inspired to concern, this concern
takes the form of self-judgement.

Such an activity is charac-

terized by reflection or analyzation.
For one does not become a Christian by means of reflection, but to become a Christian in reflection means
that ther:i is another thing to be rejected; one does
not reflect oneself into being a Christian, but out of
another thing in order to become a Christian; and this
is more especially the case in Christendom, where one
must refle/ oneself out of the semblance of being a
Christian. ,
Another important category to bear in mind in discussing the indirect approach utilized by Kierkegaard is the
fact that he writes from a position of no authority.

As a

peculiar poet with dialectical ability, he avoids any attempt
to prove the truth of revelation or to enter into dogmatic
discussions.

He indirectly unfolds this truth in a polemic

fashion, presenting world -views which are both pro and con,
which then leave the reader to decide in the matter for himself.

As an author

without authority," Kierkegaard is able,

particularly by the pseudonyms, to approach the reader as a
Socratic occasion to compel him to take notice.

'dhat is to

be noticed is not the authorship per se, but the quality of
one's existence in relation to the authority revealed in
Christ.

In writing "without authority," Kierkegaard juxta-

poses his authorship to the historical developments which
stem from the authority of Christ, i.e. the Bible, the Church,
the clergy, and the Sacraments.

He criticizes the misuse of

authority by the Church, but he never denounces the authority
it has.

Writing "without authority" indirectly implies that

93Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 96.

there is a sphere which is with authority, but he prods the
individual not to be satisfied with the misused authorities,
but rather to become "contemporary" with the ultimate authority:

Jesus Christ.
The Authorship
Armed with his immense genius, Kierkegaard dedicates

his entire life as a sacrifice to his age in the form of his
writings.

Seldom, if ever, does one encounter an author of

the caliber of Soren Kierkegaard.

His writings encompass

topics ranging from the aesthetic to the religious, the
philosophical to the theological, the scholarly to the intimately personal.

In order to gain some insight into this

massive literary accomplishment, what is required is, again,
a feel for the dialectical.

In approaching the authorship,

we can see almost every aspect of the dialectical represented.
4e have already acknowledged the intellectual genius
of Kierkegaard.

Such mental talent characterizes Kierkegaard's

nature and, as such, he can legitimately be called a dialectician.

As an "essential author," Kierkegaard utilizes this

aspect of the dialectical and reveals the spectrum of his
world-view as well as other world -views.

Hence that aspect

of the dialectical which connotes logic and reflection are
exhibited in Kierkegaard the dialectician.
That aspect of the dialectical which specifies dialogue is blatant in Kierkegaard's method of maieutics.

By

approaching the reader indirectly, Kierkegaard stimulates the
reader to respond concerning the issue of what it is to become

L9
a Christian.

A dialogue is intended to result between the

author and the reader.

In Philosophical Fragments and the

the essay "He Will Draw All" in Training in Christianity.
Kierkegaard actually offers an example of this dialogue by
including the reactions of a supposed reader.

Also, dialogue

is present within the authorship itself as exemplified by
Either/Or.

Here Judge William and "A" dialogue with one

another in order to reveal the aesthetic and ethical world views.

Kierkegaard uses this author to author dialogue

throughout the authorship.

Often ore pseudonym will quote

or refer to another pseudonym.

Johannes Climacus, in Con-

cluding Unscientific Postscript, reviews the various pseudonyms employed by Kierkegaard revealing how dialogue is an
integral ingredient to the interpretation of the authorship.
Another aspect of the dialectical evident in the
authorship is polarity, or duplicity.

The duplicity of the

authorship inheres in the fact that the authorship is both
aesthetic and religious.
That is to say, the duplicity, the ambiguity, is a
conscious one, something the author knows more about
than anybody else; it is the essential dialectical
distinction of the whole authorship, and has therefore
a deeper reason . . . the duplicity dates from the
very start. For the Two Edifying Discourses are contemporaneous with EitheLVOr. T7'le dr1icity in the
deeper sense, that is, in the sense of the authorship
as a whole, is not at all what was a subject of comment in its time, viz, the contrast between the two
parts of Either/Or. No, the duplicity is discovered
94
by comparing Either/Or_ and the Two Edifying Discourses.
A sensitivity for the dialectical can recognize yet
another aspect:

movement.

This aspect is best seen in
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94Kierkegaard,
Point of View, pp. 10-11
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relation to the stages of existence, or the three major world views described by Kierkegaard.

These stages are not neces-

sarily to be seen in chronological order.

Rather, they are

three qualities of existence which can be present in an individual in differing proportions.

Yet the authorship defi-

nitely relays a sense of movement through these stages to
arrive at the existence of perfect quality:

Christ's.

A

sense of dialectical movement can be gained from the following quote for example:
The religious writer must, therefore, first get in
touch with men. That is, he must begin with aesthetic
achievement . . . so that with the momentum gained by
devotion to the aesthetic, 14ey rush headlong into
contact with the religious.Y,
The presence of logic or reflection, dialogue, polarity or
duplicity, and literary movement all reveal the dialectical
character of the authorship.
The Reader
Although Kierkegaard diagnoses the age, the Church,
and abstract thought, he nevertheless consistently directs his
works to the single reader.
with phrases like "My hearer

Often he begins his discussions
•

•

, or "My reader . • •

In fact, Kierkegaard devotes much of his literary activity to
categorizing and constituting "that Individual" who would
dialectically involve himself and yield an honest ear to what
Kierkegaard is presenting.

Of course, this might all seem

superfluous: only one person can read a book at one time.
But the importance of the category of individuality is vali95Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 26.
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dated in light of the crowd mentality that Kierkegaard is
trying to counter.

The category of the individual is, then,

polemically related to the objectivizing trends of an ape
whereby the concrete is lost in the abstract.
If the crowd is the Evil, if chaos is what threatens
us, there is salvation only in one thing; in becoming
a single individual, in the thoun; of that individual as an essential category.w'
As an "essential category," the individual is not
just a category for a Kierkegaardian reader, however, it is
a corrective category utilized to destroy the barrier of a
crowd mentality resulting from the infiltration of a concept
of mediation and objectivity.

By introducing this category

to Christendom, Kierkegaard hopes to focus attention on the
personal relationship to God.

Before one can discuss ethics,

inwardness, subjectivity, passion or faith, it is first
necessary to extract the individual man from all the relativities that would distract him from relating to the absolute,
i.e. his eternal happiness.

Only as an individual can one

stand in a position before God and assume responsibility for
the things that God requires.

Because God's requirements are

the same for all men, and since men can only accept responsibility for those requirements as individuals, all men, therefore, are capable of becoming individuals.

Individuality is

not dependent on talents or intellectual ability.
It must be emphasized that the category of the individual is presented mainly as a corrective maneuver.

As much

as Kierkegaard sees individuality as a necessary condition

96Kierkegaard, Point
of View, p.

52
for the reception of Christianity, the category itself is not
peculiar to Christianity alone.

The individual ran be a

Christian, but not necessarily so.

The value system by which

one defines one's individuality determines what type of
individual one becomes.

There are individuals in Judaism,

Eastern religions, Western religions, and non-religions.

The

category itself is, for Kierkegaard, strategically corrective.
As a category, individuality is not of political,
economic, or social pertinence.
the realm of spirit.

Rather, it is pertinent to

Also, the cateory is not to be confused

with other nineteenth century individualisms stemming from
Romanticism.

Kierkegaard is not advocating a Romantic ex -

centricity whereby individuality is defined as being different from the crowd.

Rather, Kierkepaard's category of

individuality is a possibility for all men, for all men can
attain to the spiritual.

Here too, it should be mentioned

that Kierkegaard's category of individuality is not the same
as the definition given to the term by present day existentialists.

The existential individual chooses or creates him-

self by making his own values and authenticates himself in
them.

The Kierkegaardian individual views himself as created

by God and personally responsible for the ethical demands
placed on him by the values that God has sanctioned.

Kierke-

gaard uses this category to edify his reader by making him
take notice of the fact that he, as an individual, exists
before God.
The notion of the dialectical is again required in
order to understand this category of the individual.

As an
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individual, one attains one's selfhood and establishes one's
reality.

The establishment of one's individual reality re-

sults from the interest that one has in one's self.

This

interest, or passion, is present in the moment of comparison
when the empirical self is measured against the ideal self.
To put it simply, the individual realizes that there is a
difference between what he is (the empirical self) ard what
he could be (the ideal self).

The reality of the self is

found in the moment where these two aspects of one's self
interplay with one another.

It is in this dialectical moment

that the individual has his interest, or inter-esse.

Such an

interest is, in fact, the passion which is foundational for
the existing individual.

Passion is the thermometer of

individual existence.
Existence constitutes the highest interest of the
existing individual, and his interest in his existence
constitutes his reality. What reality is cannot be
expressed in the language of abstraction. Reality is
an inter-esse between the moments of that hypothetical
unity of thought and being which abstract thought
presupposes . . . Reality or existence is the dialectical moment in a trilogy, whose beginning and
whose end cannot be for the existing individual,
since qua existing jondividual he is himself in the
dialectical moment.Y(
In becoming an individual, passionately interested in one's
selfhood, the possibility to escape into abstract speculation
is no longer an option.

Rather, one's attentions are centered

on the concrete involvements in knowing one's self.
97Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
p. 279.
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Philosophical Fragments:

An Example of Maieutics

By far the best example of Kierkegaard's methodology
is his pseudonymous work Philosophical Fragments.

This work

is a biting satire on speculative philosophy as well as an
excellent illustration of maieutics.

Before we enter into a

discussion of the work, it would be best to introduce Johannes
Climacus, the pseudonymous author of both Philosophical Fragments and Concludin

Unscientific Postscri.t.

This pseudonym

in particular is a satire on speculative philosophy.

By

understanding his nature, one can better understand the subtle
workings in Philosophical Fragments.
Kierkegaard uses Johannes Climacus with the most
poignant irony.

The irony does not consist solely in what

Climacus says, but consists in the totality of the character
that Climacus is.

F's character and personal history are

described in the small work Johannes Climacus or. De Omnibus
Dubitandum Est.

As the title implies, Climacus is a character

who does exactly what philosophy demands'
thing.

he doubts every -

Climacus actually becomes the epitomy of speculations

pure thought personified.

Irony results when this character,

who exemplifies philosophy, attempts to do just what philosophy claims to have accomplished'
Christianity.

to unite Idealism and

The contradictions and shortcomings of Climacus

attempt are therefore a satire on speculative philosophy itself.
There is a natural tendency to confuse the personality
of Johannes Climacus with that of Kierkegaard.

It cannot be

denied that Climacus is an amplification of some aspect of
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Kierkegaard and clues to the nature of Kierkegaard the man
should be evident in his pseudonyms.

Walter Lowrie, in A

Short Life of Kierkegaard, supplies information which supports
the view that Kierkegaard writes as a means of self -catharsis.
This view can lead to viewing Kierkegaard psychologically;
trying to understand the man behind the authorship in order
to better understand the authorship.

This is a superfluous

endeavor because the authorship is designed to disguise its
author.

Granted. Kierkegaard directs his works toward

specific people, events, and experiences, but it is best not
to limit one's perspective of the authorship to Kierkegaard's
personal history.
into its own.

It is best to allow the authorship to come

Kierkegaard is not writing of himself that the

reader should hope to learn about Kierkegaard.

Rather, he

writes so that the reader would want to learn about becoming
a Christian.

When Kierkegaard is regarded as a corrective,

then it becomes easier to recognize Climacus as a means to
the overall goal of the authorship, rather than an opportunity
for Kierkegaard to indirectly tell the reader about himself.
Yet this is not to say that Kierkegaard does not indirectly
reveal himself in Climacus.

Many of the experiences recounted

in Johannes Climacus are, in fact, autobiographical, but
Johannes Climacus is not Kierkegaard's autobiography.
To describe Johannes Climacus is to describe an exaggeration, a caricature of a resolute philosopher.

He becomes

the personified logical result of worshipping the created order
in the form of "pure" thought, the notion of mediation, and
objectivity.

Climacus is the result of Kierkegaard's ability
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in logical dialectics and he symbolizes that objective,
speculative approach to life.

Climacus is a viewpoint rather

than a personality: Climacus is a tool in a method rather
than an end in himself.

To attempt to understand Climacus

apart from first identifying Kierkecaard as a corrective would
result in approaching Climacus in the wrong context.

Knowing

Kierkegaard's corrective intent minimizes the tendency to
read too much into the autobiographical material of Johannes
Climacus.
Kierkegaard does use experiences from his childhood to
develop the make-believe character of Climacus.

But these

autobiographical insights are given only to describe Climacus,
not Kierkegaard.

This is evident in the fact that Climacus

is described only in terms of thought and knowledge.

The

childhood experiences deal with Climacus

Every

education.

other area of Climacus' life is non-existent since he is
thought personified.
is his father.

The main source of education for Climacus

As with Kierkegaard, the father dominates the

childhood of Climacus.

It is the father who encourages and

displays the talent of mind, logical dialectics.

Kierkegaard

describes how Climacus learns to exercise his mind as he and
his father walk around the living room pretending to be
visiting distant cities.98

Climacus grows to be fascinated

by that aspect of the concept of the dialectical which suddenly inverts the logical movement of an argument.

When his

father would argue with his peers, he would, to Climacus'
98
Soren Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus
Dubitandum Est, trans. T. H. Croxall 'U,ondont Adam and Charles
Black, 1991), p. 105.
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amazement, rearrange his opponent's challenges and force him
to conclude from his own premises the exact opposite of what
he initially argued.

"dhat was clear became obscure, what

was certain doubtful, contradiction became self-evident.99
Kierkegaard vividly describes this dialectical movement which
results in an ironic inversion, as a snark moving toward its
prey.

As an observer would be dazzled by the flash of the

shark's white belly as the prey is hit, so too, Climacus is
dazzled by the similar movement of logical dialectics which
suddenly alternates to ironically change a synonym to an
antonym and invert the whole.
Experiences in school also contribute to the development of dialectical acumen in Climacus.

As a student,

Climacus maintains an observer, spectator stance.

He would

"take notice of everything; and when he got home he pondered
.100
what the philosophizers had said.

Climacus' interest in

Greek grammar also enhances his ability in logical dialectics.
He comes to view the accusative case (i.e. the direct object)
as extension in space and emphasizes empty rather than filled
space.

Here can be seen a fundamental opposition to Hegelian -

ism which emphasizes the unity of ontology and thought whereas
Climacus emphasizes the distance between objective being and
101
subjective knowing.
99Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, p. 107.
10
°Ibid., p. 109
101Ibid., pp. 106-10r.
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The nature of Climacus as a person, if one can describe the personality of a pseudonym, is that of a romantic
individual.

The submergence of Climacus into dialectical

thought causes him to be "alien from the world"102 and to be
exempt from normal childhood activities and maturation experiences.103 "Indeed his life was always romantic, even though
he needed no woods and wanderings for his romances, but only
what he possessed - a little room with one window. .,104
Climacus' only joy is in dialectical thought.

He

experiences great distress if he is unable to maintain the
logic of a complex sylogism,105 "his whole life is thinking,"106
his interest is in the movement of this father's arguments.107
Hence, Climacus is the personification of logical dialectics.
"Results were not of great consequence to him.

Only the

movements of thought as such interested him."108

Climacus

is the epitomized thinker.
If we just take Kierkegaard at his word and accept
Johannes Climacus as an account of Johanned Climacus, a clearer
concept of Kierkegaard's irony will result.

If we also accept

Kierkegaard as a corrective who utilizes the maieutical method
102Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, P• 104.
103Ibid., p. 108.
104, ,.,
bia
pp. 109-110.
105Ib1d., p. 104.
106Ibid.,

p. 108.

107Ibid., p. 107.
108Ib1d., p. 10g.
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of indirect communication, what is being done with Johannes
Climacus will become more evident.

Climacus should not be

used as a window into the personality of Kierkepaard as much
as he should be seen as an example of Kierkegaardian irony; a
tool utilized to "wound from behind for edification."
The work Philosophical Fragments contains the irony
resultant from Climacus' nature latent on every page.

The

book is presented as a "project of thought," and in order to
dupe the idealistic reader, speculative terms are used to
describe the more Christian concepts.

Immediately the

idealistic reader will identify with the language and the
ostensible intent of the works

to deduce Christianity from

Idealism.
My Fragments approached the problem of Christianity
in a decisive manner, but without mentioning its name
nor the name of Christ. In an age of knowledge, when
all men are Christians and know what Christianity is,
it is only too easy to use the sacred names without
attaching any thought to them, to recite Christian
truth ipx,rote without having the slightest impression
of it.'"
Because of the nature of Climacus, i.e. thought personified,
the idealistic reader initially views Climacus as an ally,
but by the end of the first chapter, it is evident that
Climacus is attempting to do more than a "humble dance in the
service of thought."
Philosophical Fragments poses the question "Is an
historical point of departure possible for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure have any other
109Kierkegaard, concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 252.
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than a merely historical interest; i.:, it possible to base an
eternal happiness upon historical knowledge?"

The format of

the book deals with this question like a classical drama in
five acts, with an interlude between the last two acts suggestive of a "passage of time. 110 Each "act" deals with the
question of the highest truth and how it can be apprehended
by the individual human being.
statements to make:

The book has three basic

1) to align Christianity with Idealism

is a gross confusion; 2) Christianity necessarily appears to
the individual as offensive; and 3) there is no essential
difference between a "second-hand disciple" and an "eyewitness" in respect to their accepting Jesus as God.

All

three of these statements are directed against the notion of
mediation.

The motto, "Better well hung than ill wed," refers

to the union of Christianity and Idealism which results from
mediation.
A look at the first chapter will suffice to show how
Climacus satirically mocks philosophy with subtle ironies.
Climacus renounces any authority or any opinion and merely
asks the reader to go through the movements of logic with him
as he attempts to arrive at Christianity from an hypothesis.
He approaches the reader Socratically in the Propositio:
"The question is asked in ignorance, by one who does not
even know what can have led him to ask it."

Since the ques-

tion concerns an historical point of departure, the hyp3thesis
110
Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans.
David Swenson (Princeton, New Jerseys Princeton University
Press, 1936), p. 89.
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which governs Philosophical Fragments is "the Moment in time
must have a decisive significance."111

Already the stage is

being set for the idealistic reader to become offended, but
because he sees the speculative method that Climacus proposes,
he is carried along.

Yet the brighter reader can see that

such an hypothesis is completely adverse to Idealism.

The

fact that Climacus proposes to deduce from a hypothesis satisfies the speculative method but his hypothesis itself contradicts Idealism.

Also, the Propositio contains a deeper irony.

In this statement of Socratic ignorance, Climacus is alluding
to a major distinction which appears through the authorshipi
the distinction between God and man, the Creator and the
creation.

Unlike Hegel, Kierkegaard does not view man as

being able to progressively attain the Kingdom of God.

There

is an absolute difference between God and man which the mere
notion of mediation cannot reconcile.

In fact, nothing which

stems from the heart of man can bridge the gap between man
and God, because man's heart is desparately wicked.

Any

mere hypothesis must therefore be seen as originating in man,
but trues of God must originate with God and come to man in
the form of revelation.

To take a truth of revelation and

convert it to a mere hypothesis is to be "ill wed."

Climacus

seemingly utilizes an Idealistic method by claiming Socratic
ignorance and beginning from an hypothesis, but upon closer
inspection we can see that the hypothesis can only contradict
Idealism and that the Propositio ridicules the vain philosophers who attempt to rationalize the Incarnation of God in
111Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 16.
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Jesus as something they thought up when they devised their
systems.
Chapter one, entitled "A Project of Thought," begins
with the question "how far does the Truth admit of being
112
learned?"

Climacus immediately performs a dialectical in-

version on the question by pointing out the fact that the
question implies that one does not yet know the Truth; that
"its non-existence is evidently presupposed."113

For the

next six pages, Climacus explores the Socratic response to
Here the doctrine of recol-

the question of learning truth.
lection is introduced.

The learner needs only to recollect,

or be reminded of the truth which he already knows.

"Thus

the Truth is not introduced into the individual from without,
but was within him.

”114

The Moment has no essential identity

in the method of recollection.

Since truth inheres in a man,

the when, where, or because of whom, has no bearing as long
as eventually the truth is learned.

Hence the Socratic

midwife who causes a man to realize his own truth, and the
historical moment when this realization occurs, are merely
"occasional" or "accidental" in relation to the man because
he already had the truth in him.

That he discovers it at this

time or that time is really unimportant.

Obviously the only

truth a Socratic man is prone to is a truth originating in the
heart of man.

There is no room for revelation because "In

112Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 11.
113Ibid.
114Ibid.

63
the Socratic view, each individual is his own center, and the
entire world centers on him, because his self-knowledge is a
.
knowledge of God. 115

In Idealism, everything is submerged

into an ideal which is timeless, continuously present, and unchangeable.

The criticism that Kierkepaard gives to his cul-

ture is again present here:

all is leveled into an abstrac-

tion.
The temporal point of departure is nothing; for as
soon as I discover that I have known the Truth from
eternity without being aware of it, the same instant
this moment of occasion is hidden in the Eternal, and
so incorporated with it that I cannot even find it so
to speak, even if I sought it; because in my eternal
consciousness there is neither here nor there, but
116
only an ubique et nusquam (everywhere and nowhere).
The discussion in the first half of chapter one concerning the doctrine of recollection is dialectically logical
but not really ironic.

In this discussion, Climacus merely

carries the Socratic stance to its conclusions.

The irony

becomes evident in the second half of the chapter when Climacus
begins to purposely confuse Idealism and Christianity by applying the speculative method of logical dialectics to Christian doctrines of faith.

From the hypothesis that the Moment

is decisive, Climacus first of all discusses the antecedent
state of a man who learns the truth.
117
man is in a state of Error.

Climacus concludes that

If the moment is decisive,

then the teacher must be more than a mere occasion for the
learner.

Therefore, the teacher must bring the truth to the

115Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 14.
116Ibid., pp. 15-16.
117Ibid., p. 17.
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learner, and provide the "condition necessary for understanding it. -

The "condition - is an indirect reference to the

activity of the Holy Spirit, but Climacus cannot use such
terms because this work is only a project of thought.

A

teacher who brings truth and bestows the condition for understanding it must, in fact, recreate the learner.

"But this

is something that no human being can do; if it is to be done,
it must be done by the God himself."118
Before we continue to follow Climacus' first chapter,
it would be wise to point out the inherent humor and irony in
Climacus

logic.

revelation.

The real irony is his attempt to deduce

Like Hegel, if you allow Climacas his initial

hypothesis that the moment is decisive, then you can logically
follow along with what he says and arrive at his conclusions.
But somehow you become aware that something isn't "kosher:"
you begin to suspect that Climacus is merely being sophistical.

And sophistry is exactly what Climacus is engaged in.

At this point in the discussion, one becomes aware of a change
in the tempo of Climacus' logic.

It is as if this master of

logic, this lover of dialectical movement, begins to jump
rungs on his logical ladder; his momentum increases and within
the next three paragraphs Climacus, almost magically, classifies man as a sinner;

the Teacher' as giving freedom there-

fore being the 3aviour, the Redeemer, the Atoner, and the
Judge.

The sophistry of Climacus allows him to then bring the

doctrine of conversion, repentance, and sin into his "deductions."

It is almost like Jesus saying to Judas, "What you
118Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 18.
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have to do, do quickly."

What has taken centuries for God

to reveal concerning His Son. Climacus manages to deduce in
two paragraphs!
It it seems a bit too much that all these doctrines
of the Christian faith could be deduced from the simple
assumption that the moment is decisive, then the irony and
humor of Climacus is becoming apparent.

Kierkegaard anti-

cipates this awareness on the part of the reader, so he includes the reader's comments in a dialogue with Climacus at
the end of the chapter.

The reader protests that he already

knows all about these Christian concepts and he chides
Climacus for having the audacity to claim authorship of them.
But Climacus, adhering to his nature as a dialectician in
love with logical movement, acknowledges that he is not the
author.

In fact, no man is the author because these concepts

originate in God's revelation.

Precisely here lies the pos-

sibility of offense because C3imacus proposes to begin with
an hypothesis, but he concludes with revelation.

He ini-

tially satisfies man's prideful nature to find truth by himself but, through sophistry, he ends up offending man's
nature by ironically showing the futility of trying to speculate oneself into a relation to God.
Climacus deals with the issue of confusing Idealism
with Christianity, the necessity of offense, and the concept
of contemporaneity with Christ in the remainder of the book.
But the first chapter suffices to show how Philosophical Fragments acts as a satire on speculative philosophy and exemplifies Kierkegaard's maieutical method of indirect communication.
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The Maieutical Schema;

Stages of Existence

The schema that Kierkeraard uses to isolate his reader
,
that individual," can be divided into three basic
levels of
personal existence;
religious.

the aesthetic, the ethical, and the

Each stage has its own qualities, presuppositions,

and world-view, which are presented by Kierkegaard
and his
pseudonyms.

Each stage serves as a mirror in which the

reader may recognize himself.

The pseudonym 'A" in EitheriOr

for example, presents the presuppositions and qualit
ies of
the aesthetic stage.

If thA reader is, in fact, an "aesthete,"

he will immediately identify with "A" and see himsel
f in
aesthetic terms.

Then as he continues reading, he is led

along to the conclusions that that world-view demand
s.

In

most cases, the pseudonym carries the presuppositions to
their conclusions in a more exact fashion than the aesthe
tic
reader has, so that upon completion of the work, the
reader
comes to realize the content of his life in a way that
he
never did before.

Since no real choices are made for the

reader by the pseudonym, the reader is left to his own
selfreflection to decide one way or the other concerning the
work and the effect it will have on his life.

The fact that

some sort of decision has to he made concerning his existe
nce
is only indirectly given in the writings, but that fact now
lies heavy on the reader because the whole maieutical method
depends on the fact that man is by nature a creature of
choice.

In other words, man is inherently a creature of

faith, and his faith is determined by the object that man
accepts for himself.

Today it is often said that man needs
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faith; if only man had faith he could be "saved."
is a misunderstanding.

Man has faith.

But this

The question is not

whether man has faith; rather, the question should ask what
the object of man's faith is.
The stages represent three basic qualities of existence available to man.

Each stage has its own way of defin-

ing life and identifying the individual.

These definitions

stem from the assumptions inherent in that quality of existence.

However one defines one's life will determine which

level of existence one best aligns with.

Therefore, this

schema categorizes people according to the way in which they
define themselves.

It is Kierkegaard's intent to use his

genius to explore each of these stages in order to maieutically bring the reader to a point where he is aware of himself
and his obligations if he really wants to become a Christian.
My principle thought was that in our age, because of
the great increase of knowledge, we had forgotten
what it means to exist, and what inwardness signifies,
and that the misunderstanding between speculative
philosophy and Christianity was explicable on this
ground . . . If men had forgotten what it means to
exist religiously, they had doubtless also forgotten
what it means to exist as human beings; this must
therefore be set forth. But above all it must not be
done in a dogmatizina manner, for then the misunderstanding would instantly take the explanatory effort
to itself in a new misunderstanding, as if existing
consisted in getting to know something about this or
that. If communicated in the form of knowledge, the
recipient is led to adopt the misunderstanding that
it is knowledge he is to receive. 00 then we are
again in the sphere of knowledge)In this exploration of existence, the levels are not
to be viewed as necessarily being in some chronological order.
MiNall==•••••••

11
9Kierkegaard. Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 223.
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They are arranged from the lower to the higher, the worst to
the best, but the stages are qualities which can be present
In a man in varient proportions.

A man may be able to recog-

nize aspects of more than one stage in his life, but Kierkegaard does not want to deal with mere aspects of life but the
total quality of one's existence.

One may have an ethical

relationship with one's parents, attend church on Sunday and
still live in an aesthetic fashion.

As a corrective, Kierke-

gaard uses the stages to reach into the very core of a man
and his identity.

This schema allows us to explore what

Solomon meant when he said - As a man thinketh in his heart,
so is he." (Prov. 2317).
Too many people have misunderstood Kierkegsard when
he had Climacus say that "what it means to exist as a human
being . . . must therefore be set forth."

These people have

wrongly called Kierkegaard "the Father of Existentialism."
Kierkegaard's purpose of delving into the levels of existence
and exploring their characteristics is purely therapeutic.
It must be remembered that Kierkegaard is a religious author;
he begs the reader in Point of View to understand him as such
and he excuses himself from any of the wrong conclusions that
"Herr Professors" may draw from his works.

One of these

wrong conclusions is aligning Kierkegaard with the modern
Existential movement.

That such a view of Kierkegaard's

works could occur is not surprising.

Kierkegaard himself

realizes the "tremendous existential compass" which "is possible outside Christianity," but his interest in existence
is purely as a corrective, "as a pre-condition for properly

69
.120
entering Christianity.
"The religious writer must, therefore, first get into
touch with men.

That is, he must begin with aesthetic achieve-

ment . . . so that with the momentum gained by devotion to
the aesthetic, they rush headlong into contact with the
religious.

,,121

Constantly, consistently, yet indirectly, the

ever-present intent and motivation behind all of Kierkepaard's
works is to confront the reader with what it is to become a
Christian.
The process is this: a poetic and philosophic
nature is put aside in order to become a Christian
. . So the aesthetic production is certainly a
deceit, yet in another sense it is a necessary
elimination. The religious is present from the
very first and has a decisive predominance, but for
a while it waits patiently to give the poet leave
to talk himself out, yet all the time the watch wi
Argus eyes to make sure the poet does not fool
Armed, then, with all this ability and talent, Kierkegaard sets forth to describe what it is to be a human being.
He sets for himself the task of presenting three basic
qualities of existence, the third having two components.

These

levels must, therefore, be dealt with in order to understand
the total corrective approach by which Kierkegaard relates to
his age.
tence:

Succinctly. "There are thus three spheres of existhe aesthetic, the ethical, the religious.

dary zones correspond to these three:

Two boun-

irony, constituting the

boundary between the aesthetic and the ethical; humor, as the
120
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 259.
121
Kierkegaard, Point of View, p. 26.
122Ibid., p. 73.
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boundary that separates the ethical from the religious."123
Each sphere has its own faith content or presuppositons, and
its own paradoxes.

The movement through the spheres consti-

tutes a dialectic of existence, a movement whereby the individual ultimately comes to know himself in his position before
God and chooses between Faith in Christ or offense.
The Aesthetic Stage
The aesthetic sphere of existence explores the individual in his most pagan state.

The presupposition that under -

girds this sphere is "anything goes."

It is devoid of any

ethical framework, and its goal is enjoyment and pleasure.
All is subsumed in the quest for happiness.

Life is to be

lived on the crest of the moment where every experience and
sensation is met in vivid newness and freshness.
has three basic tenets*

This sphere

the love of immediacy, the exalta-

tion of the moment, and the utilization of a poetical spectator stance.

In short, the aesthetic stage of existence is

a reiteration of philosophical hedonism where the self is
defined solely in terms of pleasure and gratification.
Examples of aesthetes can be found particularly in
children.

For a child, life is viewed with extreme expectancy.

Life has not, as yet, attained a continuity so every experience
is totally new, totally fresh.

Also in childhood, memories

are the most vivid, yet too, the most vague.

The child is

determined by his environment, in that if the child is amused
123Kierkepaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 448.
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and preoccupied in his surroundings, he is satisfied and content, but when the surroundings are changed, so too the child,
and he then seeks another form of amusement being unable to
reconcile himself to life's discontinuity.
A poet is also an example of an aesthete.

The poet

too exalts the moment, trying to capture it in his poetic
representation.
immediate.

In order to do so, he deals with the purely

He gives praise to the sights, smells, and feel-

ings which relate to the situation that he is attempting to
capture.

This requires an ability to distance himself from

the situation, so that he can view life as a spectator, as if
life were being acted out on some stage.

His involvement in

life is purely paltry, for as soon as he becomes involved, he
immediately extracts himself for the sake of poeticizing his
experience.
Those advocates of Speculative Philosophy, as well as
those scholars, historians, and theologians who deal with
life solely at the level of speculation are also examples of
aesthetes.
tivity.

They resolve all existence into a level of objec-

They function merely as spectators, forgetting their

own personal involvement in the world from which they abstract.
Obviously, another example of aesthetes is those who
adhere to a "playboy" philosophy of hedonism.

The object of

worship is the self in its own immediate gratification.

There

are no limitations placed on their conduct and they cannot
accept any responsibility for their actions or the results of
their actions.

The present moment of pleasure is the only

thing that matters, and as long as there is an amount of

'2
gratification of their immediate desires, they are satisfied.
In the aesthetic realm, quality is disregarded and
life is measured solely in terms of quantity.

It is not so

much the quality of satisfaction that is derived from life
as it is the quantity.

The aesthete gathers moments of

pleasure and determines his life by the amount tallied.
Kierkeemard, in the guise of his pseudonym "A" in
Either/Or, ofiers a method of approaching life in an aesthetic
manner.

He calls this method the "Rotation Method."

This

method is based on the world-view offered in the aesthetical
realm.

In presenting this method, "A" begins by stating that

all men are bores," that "boredom is the root of all evil."124
Boredom provides the impetus for movement in life, in order to
drive one to "make new discoveries."

"A" exalts the manner

of children, pointing out how children are well behaved when
they are not bored.

Boredom is seen as the problem which

manifests itself by driving history forward; history is the
recordings of how men tried to escape boredom.12-5

"A

then

offers some advice to his own generation to remedy this everpresent problem of overcoming boredom.

Rather than using

money to pay the national debt, it should be used instead
"for public entertainment."

This idea was no mere joke because

Copenhagen did, in fact, pride itself in its artistic accomplishments and 'A" only wants to take that pride to its logical
conclusions.
124
Zoren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, 2 vols. Vol. 1
trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Swenson; Vol. 2 trans.
Walter Lowrie (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1944), p. 281.
125Ib1d., p. 282.

73

"A" offers various devious devices to get money for
the purpose of entertainments
napping.

borrowing it, and even kid-

This type of deviousness for the sake of money is

sanctioned in the aesthetic realm because it will ultimately
be used for gratification.

Possibly this was the type of

thinking Kierkegaard was referring to in The Present Age when
he said, "In the end, therefore, money will be the one thing
people will desire, which is moreover only representative, an
126
abstraction.
"A" even offers advice on who should rule this society
of boredom evaders:

"ie ought to make him king who utters
the best witticism."127 And this is how it should be, if
what is the highest is entertainment and enjoyment.

"I assume

that it is the end and aim of every man to enjoy himself."12E
This is a trivialization of ethics, but an aesthete is not
expected to understand the ethical, only the higher spheres
can comprehend the lower; to the lower, the higher are paradoxes.

Hence, "A" can confusingly use an ethical term such

as "duty" in a completely unethical way:

"It is our duty to

enjoy ourselves."129
Boredom arises from one's past and if it is not overcome, then the future confronts one in the form of frustration, in that one is bored because the past was more amusing
126
Kierkegaard, The Present Are, p. L.O.
127Kierkegaard, Either/Or, p. 284.
128Ibid., p. 285.
129
Ib1d., p. 286.
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than the present, and one is frustrated because the future
might not be as amusing as the past.
to be abandoned.130

Therefore, all hope is

The aesthete can have no telos; only

the present moment oar offer any significance, provided one
is not bored.
If, then, boredom is the root of all evil, the task
is to evade boredom, and this is done by utilizing the
"rotation method."

The rotation method can be either exten-

sive or intensive.

Extensive rotation alters the object of

one's enjoyment'

one's entertainment, one's company, one's

Intensive rotation focuses more on the subject of

locale.

the enjoymen-:'

how one is relating to life.

Not only should

the aesthete vary his activities, his possessions and his
companionships, he must also vary his approach to these
What is rotated is the "crop and the mode of culti-

things.
vation."

"A" recommends the process of "forgetting-

remembering" as the aesthetic approach to life.
The method of forgetting-remembering establishes th2
self at a poetic distance from itself.
No moment must be permitted so great a significance
that it cannot be forgotten when convenient; each
moment ought, however, to have so much significance
that it can be recollected at will . . . The more
poetically one remembers, the more easily one forgets; for remembering poetically is really only
another expression for forgetting. In a poetic
memory the experience has undergone a transfortion,
by which it has lost all its painful aspects.'
130Kierkegaard, Either/0r, p. 288.
131,bid.
132Ib1d., p. 289.
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The art in dealing with such experiences consists
in talking them over, thereby depriving them of their
bitterness; not forgetting them absolutely, but forgetting them for the sake of remembering them
Forgetting is the shears with which you cut away what
you cannot use, doing it under the supreme direction
of memory . . . When we say that we consign something
to oblivion, we suggest simultaneously that it is to
be forgotten and yet also remembered.13)
The goal, or aim, of all this forgetting for the sake
of remembering is to "make possible the realization of a complete freedom."134

Such a freedom can only exist in a sphere

without any responsibility.

Therefore, "A" discredits the

social relationships which demand any kind of permanency
or obligation.

Friendship, marriage, group arrangements,

and political posts are out of the question for the aesthete
whose only "duty" is to himself and his personal gratification.

All these arrangements stifle personal freedom and

ninder the individual's ability to control his self-knowledge.
The man who uses the method of forgetting-remembering
is erecting the obstacle of objectivity.

Amidst all the rota-

tion both extensively and intensively, underneath all the
changes lies the real self.

The self merely dons an exterior

of irresponsibility, but no self is without responsibility.
The aesthete is responsible for controlling his approach to
life by forgetting-remembering.
this stages

And here is the paganism of

that in striving for complete self-control the

aesthete becomes God unto himself.
what he wills to evade boredom.

His only duty is to do

This pseudo-ethic can only

result in narcissism and self-worship.

The aesthete is called

133Kierkegaard, Either/OK, pp. 290-291.
134Ibid., p. 291.
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to control and institute change in his life through forgettingremembering.

"Every particular change will always come under

the general categories of remembering and forgetting.

Life

in its entirety moves in those two currents, and hence it is
essential to have them under

control..135

The key to the aesthete's self-control lies in distancing himself from any concrete interaction with life.

He

is forced to view life as purely accidental so that he can
take from it whatever he wills while not being obligated to
anything other than his own desires.
The whole secret lies in arbitrariness . . . You
enjoy something entirely accidental: you consider the
whole of existence from this standpoint: let its
reality be stranded thereon . . . It is extremely
wholesome thus to let the realities of life split
upon an arbitrary interest. You transform something
accidental into the absolute, and, as such, into the
object of your admiration.13°
Here is where Kierkegaard directed his corrective
approach: precisely at making

e relatiIc the absolute.

And

herein lies the paradox that the aesthete is ultimately confronted with.

The thrust of the aesthetic realm is to over-

come boredom, which is related to the passage of time.
Therefore, rather than oblige himself to time and its movement, the aesthete vainly attempts to extract a pure moment
and tries to lose himself in that moment.
all is that the moment is fleeting.

But the irony of it

No matter how much con-

trol one gets over his ability to utilize the rotation method,
he is willy nilly caught in the passage of time and his attempts to ignore this fact are only sadly ironic.
135Kierkegaard, Either/Or, p. 288.
136Ibid., pp. 295-296.

At this point, the aesthete is confronted with the
boundary which limits that sphere of existence;

irony.

In

every endeavor the aesthete is confronted with the ironic
truth that his attempts are in vain.
piness, he only meets with boredom.

In his quest for hapHe tries to extract the

moment from the movement of time, but the moment passes and
eludes him.

He vainly tries

TO

take a spectator stance on

life, but is everywhere met with the obligations that demand
his engagement.

He offers explanations and rationales that

are just too abstract to satisfy the demands that he vainly
avoids.

When he realizes the vanity of his pursuits, his

only recourse is to despair.

As a man he is a synthesis of

the temporal and the eternal, but he negates the eternal and
is left in a state of contradiction and confusion.

He wrong-

ly absolutizes the relative and, in so doing, his life is an
ironic failure.
content.

He has no consistency, no stability, no real

His existence is a void, in spite of his intellec-

tual acumen.

Only by confronting the ironical truth of his

existence can he develop as an individual.

Irony meets him

at the level of his faith, his presuppositions, and challenges
him to attain to a higher quality.

"Irony limits, sets

bounds, confines, and thus imparts truth, reality, and content; it disciplines and punishes, and thereby gives stability
137
and consistency.
137Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, p. 44,
quoting Ironie, p. 338.
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The Ethical Stage
As a corrective, Kierkepaard maieutically offers the
ethical stage to the reader.

The intent of the authorship

is to present these stages so that the reader ultimately confronts that quality of existence which is Christian.

Again,

this schema does not describe the chronological sequence to
becoming a Christian.

It is not evangelistic in that sense.

Rather, it serves only to explore what it is to he human, to
exist.

The search, guided by Kierkegaard, moves through

every stage, exhausting itself until it meets with God's
revelation in Christ.

This search for the existence of man

intensifies in the ethical sphere.
The pseudonym that best exemplifies the ethical
stage is Judge William, the author of the second volume of
Either/0r.

As expected, the judge's philosophy of life is the

opposite of "A"s philosophy.

The judge opts for inwardness,

subjectivity, decisions, duty, responsibility, and so on.
The differences between the aesthete and the ethicist stem
from the difference between what each accepts by faith about
life and their own identities in that life.

The aesthete

would claim belief in nothing, but apart from his claim we
know better for he believes in himself.
claim belief in God.

The ethicist would

But we shall see that he believes in a

construct of ideals which he calls "God," and this is also
paganism for it is the worship of the created order.

Although

the beliefs of the aesthete and the ethicist are, ironically,
only two variations of the same theme (i.e. worship of the
created order), these two beliefs constitute the separation

between these two spheres.

The contradiction which arises

when these two spheres are juxtaposed comprise the irony
which marks the boundary of the aesthetic realm.

The only

way the aesthete can become an ethicist is by a movement of
faith.

Faith is the only means man has to accept and act

upon a contradiction.

To become an ethicist, the aesthete

must overcome irony and accept the opposite of what he
that he can align his life to an eter-

heretofore believed:
nal, constant, ideal.

The ethicist is born when he begins to

become a good husband, father, employee, etc.

His life takes

on a goal, and he begins to sense his eternal validity.
"Whoever does not apprehend the eternal validity of the
ethical..138
. . does not really apprehend the
Where the aesthetic deals with the ultimacy of the
moment, the ethical concerns itself with time as a whole, and
with the task of being responsible all the time, every time,
as long as one is alive.

"But when the time itself is the

task, it becomes a fault to finish before the time has transpired . .

To be finished with life before life is finished

with one, is precisely not to have finished the task . .
nothing is more certain then that the task suffices for the
whole of life."139

Where the aesthetic seeks to extract the

individual by means of taking a spectator's stance and reducing man to mere intellectual activity, the ethical calls
for total engagement in life and its responsibilities, an
138

Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,

p. 128.
139Ibid., p. 147.
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engagement that demands the involvement of the total man.
Ethics concentrates upon the individual, and ethically
it is the task of every individual to become an entire
man; just as it is the ethical presupposition that
every man is born in such a condition that he can
become one. Whether anyone realizes this task or not
makes no difference, the fact that the requirement is
theie is the important thing. And if ever so many
blind and mediocre and cowardly indiviauals renounce
their own selves in order to become something en
masse with the help of the gplierative process, ethics
does not bargain with them.14'
Judge William defends the ethical validity of friendship, marriage, love, justice, political engagement and other
virtues that the aesthete merely trivializes.

The ethical,

then, makes progress into the Socratic dictum of "know thyself" because it places the individual in relation to the
ideal.

"For the study of the ethical, every man is assigned

141
to himself.

In order to take up this assignment, the in-

dividual must decide to relate himself to the ideal.
142
siveness is the essence of the problem."
stance destroys the possibility of decision.
ethical realm can decision have significance.

"Deci-

The speculative
Only in the
"When the

question is treated in an objective manner it becomes impossible for the subject to face the decision with passion,
least of all with an infinitely interested passion."143

The

passion is aroused in the ethical because of the tension
between the actual individual and the ideal individual, and
14
°Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 309.
12.
P7
141/bid..
142/bid., p. 23.
1431b1d., p. 32.
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this passion drives him to decisiveness.

In individual

decision, what matters is his purpose, his telos, which was
abandoned in the aesthetic.

His purpose is to align himself

in his actions with the ideal.

"What makes the deed ethically

the property of the individual is the purpose: but this purpose is precisely something that never gets included in the
world -historical, . . .

World -historically I see the effect,
ethically, I see the purpose."144
The purpose of the ethical man is to conform his life
with those ideals which he has decisively accepted.

Again,

it should be emphasized that at the level of the ethical
those ideals are synonymous with virtues, so that the purely
ethical man is striving to build character only.

As yet, the

category of Christian character is still hovering in the distance.

The ethical duty is duty for duty's sake and not for

the purpose of establishing a relationship to God.

"Duty

becomes duty by being referred to God, but in duty itself I
do not come into relation with God."145

But Judge William

would still maintain that he believes in God.
The ethical task, then, is to become ethical, not
Christian, by giving ethical content to existence.

This task

is only realized once a man has extricated himself from the
crowd and has overcome the major obstacles that were delineated
in the first section of this paper.
144Ki

"It is therefore an

eritegaard, Concluding_Unscientific Postscript,

p. 139.
146
-Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, and Sickness
unto Death. trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, New Jersey;
Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 78.
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existing spirit who is now conceived as raising the question
of truth, presumably in order that he may exist in it; but in
any case the question is raised by someone who is conscious
146
of being a particular existing human being."

Unlike the

aesthete, who abstracts from concrete existence, the ethical
man, conversely, tries to understand the abstract, or the
147
ideal, concretely in his life.

In this, the intellect is

not abandoned, but utilized in proportion to the total makeup of a man.

The ethical does not destroy reflection, but it

dethrones it in order to balance it with the otner aspects of
personality.
But the ethical is not merely a knowing; it is also a
doing that is related to a knowing, and a knowing such
that the repetition may in more tan one way become more
difficult than the first doing.14 For the development of the subject consists precisely
in his active interpenetration of himself by reflection concerning his own existence, so that he really
149
thinks what he thinks through making a reality of it.
In Christendom, this task of uniting thought with existence is easily accomplished by applying the notion of mediation.

This is why Climacus constantly reminds the reader that

his purpose is to present Christianity as the most difficult
thing conceivable.

In abstract thought, this difficulty is

ignored, but for the existing individual, who at this point
is striving to becomk-kAhical, this difficulty is ever-present.
14
6Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 170.
147
Ibid., p. 315.

148

Ibid., p. 143.

149
Ibid., p. 151.
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To unite the eternal ideal with one

existential becoming is

a task which the existing individual must contend with, no
matter how difficult the task may appear.
But really to exist, so as to interpenetrate one's
existence with consciousness, at one and the same time
eternal and as if far removed from existence, and yet
also present in existence and in the process of becoming; that is truly difficult.150
Existence, like movement, is a difficult category to
deal with; for if I think it, I abrogate it, and then
I do not think it. It might therefore seem to be the
proper thing to say that there is something which
cannot be thought, namely, existence. But the difficul:4 persists, in that existence itself combines
thinking with existing, in so far as the thinker
exists.153
Again, this concept of existence as movement brings
the notion of the dialectic of existence to the fore.

The

individual, as a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal,
is, by nature, dialectical in himself.

Consequently, the

process by which true individuality is gained, must also be a
dialectical process.

In reading Kierkepaard, whenever one

comes across words such as "striving" or "becoming," the notion
of the dialectic of existence is being referred to.

In fact,

the entire category of existence can only be understood in
reference to this notion.
Does he in fact exist? Andy he does, is he then
not in process of becoming?I)
‘
When I put eternity and becoming together I do not get
rest, but coming into being and futurity.153
350Kierkegaard, Concluding_ Unscientific Postscript,
P• 273.
151Ibid„ p. 274.
152Ibid., p. 271.
153Ibid., p. 272.
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Existence is never static, only logic is static and the mixing
of the two can only result in confusion.
In keeping with the Aristotelian categories of movement,
Kierkegaard establishes the eternal as the unmoved which
delineates movement.

Movement is itself a relative term:

relative to that which is unmoved.

Here again is a polemic

against Hegelianism which resolves everything into pure abstract dialectic.

If all were flux and movement, those terms

themselves would become meaningless.

Hence, although Kierke-

gaard emphasizes the becoming of the individual, he does so
only within the context of the eternal which is the unmoved.
In the mere ethical sphere, the eternal is, again, the ideal
and, as such, serves as the goal which lies before the
becoming of the individual.

"An existing individual therefore,

has always a telos."154
In so far as existence consists in movement there
must be something which can give continuity to the
movement and hold it together, for otherwise there
is no movement . . . the unmoved is therefore a constituent of the motion as its measure and its end . .
the difficulty facing an existing individual is how
to give his existence the continuity without which
everythirw simply vanishes . . . The goal of movement
for an existing individual is to arrive at a decision,
and to renew it. The eternal is the factor of continuity; but an abstract eternity is extraneous to the
movement of life, and a concrete eternity within the
existing,irldividual is the maximum degree of his
passion.15D
The passion is aroused in confronting the paradox of
uniting the unmoved eternal with the moving temporal.

In

154
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 278.

155Ib1d., p.

P‹

keeping with the hypothesis of Philcsophical Fragments, passion exists in the moment when these two opposing factors are
unified in existence.

"It is only momentarily that the par-

ticular individual is able to realize existentially a unity
of the infinite and the finite which transcends existence.
This unity is realized in the moment of passion.01 -c6

As was

shown in Philosophical Fragments, passion is intensified because Reason has reached its limit in confrontation with paradox.

But, with the intellect directly in opposition, faith

must lay hold of this paradox and "this struggle on the part
of faith . . . constitutes the tension of its inwardness."157
Another term for passion is "interest."

The object of interest

Is, again, the paradox of uniting infinity and finitude in
existence.15'8

This interest, or passion, constitutes the

ethical pathos, "expressed through the active transformation
of the individual's entire mode of existence in conformity
with the object of his interest,.159 the object being his
existence.

"Abstract thought is disinterested, but for an

existing individual, existence is the highest interest."160
In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus
offers an allegory by which the category of passion can be
better understood.

He ponders how he could "bring a man into

156
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 176.
157Ibid.. P. 201.
158Ibid., p. 279.
159Ibid., p. 350.
160
,
bi d., ID.
278.
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a state of passion," and he proposes to do so in the context
of movement, in this case, travel.

The man is first seated

on a horse which gallops wildly; one can imagine the man passionately interested in holding on for dear life.

Or, better

yet, the man is in a hurry to go somewhere, already having
passion, and then he is placed on a horse that can scarcely
walk; one can imagine the man passionately kicking and yelling
at the horse to move quicker.

But the best way to bring out

his passion is to set him in a wagon drawn by two horses, one
is "a Pegasus and the other a worn-out-jade."

Here the horses

symbolize eternity and time respectively, and the driver is
the existing individual.

"And it is just this that it means

to exist, if one is to become conscious of it..161
tence is like driving that wagon.

Real exis-

One is interested in becoming

but is constantly struggling between his actual self in time,
and the self he is obliged to become represented in the
eternal.
Here, then, in the ethical sphere, the category of the
individual has been established.

The individual is seen as a

dialectical movement, a striving to concretize an abstract
ideal in his own concrete existence.

It is the nature of

this striving to be passionate; that the striving demands an
interest from the individual concerning his existence.

In

such a context, the reality, knowledge, and truth for the individual consists.

In diametrical opposition to Idealism,

whose truth lay in objectivity, the truth for an existing
16
1Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 276.
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individual lies solely in subjectivity.

"Subjectivity is

truth, subjectivity is reality. 162
Reality is now no longer defined in terms of the
"world -historical," or the abstract dialectic.
al's reality is the individual himself.

The individu-

Any other reality is

merely a possibility which is related in a purely cognitive
fasnion.
sibility.

For the ethical man, the ideal reality is pure posIt only becomes real when the individual passion-

ately unites that possibility with his own existence in the
moment of decision.
All knowledge about reality is possibility. The only
reality to which an existing individual may have a
relation that is more than cognitive, is his own
reality, the fact that he exists; this reality constitutes his absolute interest. Abstract thought
requires him to become disinterested in order to
acquire knowledge; the ethical demand is that he
become infinitely interested in existing. The only
reality for an existing individual is his own ethical
reality. To every other reality he stands in a cognitive relation; but true knowledge consists in translating the real into the possible.163
The real person, then, is not merely cognitive, for as such,
his life moves only in the sphere of possibility.

The real

person is the ethically existing person.164

"Ethically re-

garded, reality is higher than possibility.

The ethical pro-

poses to do away with the disinterestedness of the possible,
by making existence the infinite interest . . . there is only
one kind of ethical contemplation, namely, self-contemp1a165
tion."
162Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscripl,
p. 306.
163Ibid., p. 280.
1641bid.,
p. 281.
165Ibid., p. 284.
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Truth for the existing individual is his own existence.
He cannot find this truth in history books, or newspapers, or
the general consensus of the majority of his peers.

The only

truth that he can really have is the truth constituted by
who he is in himself.

Granted, he is striving to define him-

self in terms of the Ideal, but those are only possible determinations.

The real determinations are who he is at this par-

ticular moment in his development.

This moment, intensified

by passion, constitutes the truth of the individual.

This is

the only truth that he can ever really possess.
When subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth, the
truth becomes objectively a paradox; and the fact that
the truth is objectively a paradox shows in its turn
that subjectivity is the truth. For the objective situation is repellent; and the expression for the objective repulsion constitutes the tension and the measure
of the corresponding inwardness. The paradoxical character of the truth is its objective uncertainty; this
uncertainty is an expression for the passionatnwardness, and this passion is precisely the truth.1°°
The same principle of subjectivity and inwardness
applies in the realm of epistomology.

Any real knowledge that

the individual has necessarily concerns himself in his own
existence.

Climacus calls this "essential knowledge."

Any

knowledge which does not relate specifically to the individual's dialectical striving is "accidental knowledge" and is
essentially indifferent to the individual.

Accidental know-

ledge is subject to the same pitfalls of speculative thought.
It is knowledge based on historical approximations or other
uncertain sources and, as such, is open-ended, in that a new

P. 183.

16
6Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
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discovery or dcpma can change its content.
real essential knowledge.
tionship to the knower.

But not so with

That knowledge has a direct relaTherefore, essential knowledge is

much different than text-book knowledge.

Essential knowledge

must be ethical in content and therefore relate to existence.
"Only ethical and ethico-religious knowledge has an essential
.167
relationship to the existence of the knower.
Essential knowledge is knowledge which constitutes
the quality of the existing individual and it is made true
for the individual by the individual making its possibility
actual in action.

In discussing action, there is a tendency

to revert to a quantitative measurement.

In the realm of

subjectivity real action is not the mere external deed.

If

action were relegated to external deeds, the temptation to
measure the amount of deeds as opposed to the quality of the
deeds would arise.

Whenever the concern is with the quality

of action, one is necessarily dealing with the quality of the
actor, and this again places the interest in the subjective
realm.

The discussion of action, therefore, deals with the

subjective interest in one's actions, not the external deed
168
in and of itself.

Although this distinction must be drawn,

this is not to imply that the individual is separated from
his deeds.

Action is not only in the realm of possibility, or

in conception, but it is found at the level of interest which
167
"Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 176.
168

Ibid., p. 303.
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constitutes the quality of exirtence.

In this, action is

traced to its source in the subjectivity of the individual
and that realm which constitutes his reality.
If the content of thought were reality, the most
perfect possible anticipation of an action in thought
before I had yet acted, would be the action. In that
manner no action would ever take place, and the intellectual would swallow the ethical . . . The only
possible way of drawing a distinction between thought
and action is to relegate thought to the sphere of
the possible, the disinterested, the objective, and
to assign action to the sphere of the subjective.
But along this boundary there appears a twilight zone.
Thus when I think that I will do this or that, this
thought is not yet an action, and in all eternity it
is qualitatively distinct from action; nevertheless,
it is a possibility in which the interest of action
and of reality already reflects itself. The disinterestedness and the objectivity of thought are
on the way to being disturbed, because reality and
responsibility reach out to lay hold of it. There is
thus a sin in thought. The real action is not the
external act, but an internal decision in which the
individual puts an end to the mere possibility and
identifies himself with the content of his thp ht
in order to exist in it. This is the action.-°'
The mere thinking of performing an ethical act is
certainly not the action.

One can imagine himself performing

all sorts of benevolent deeds, but this is mere possibility
and has no bearing on the reality of the individual.

A man

can think about doing volunteer work in a hospital and a man
can actually do volunteer work in a hospital.

In respect to

the content of the possibility and the actuality there is no
difference.

But in respect to the form, the difference is

essential, and its essentiality is constituted in the subjective interest that the man takes in regard to the deed.
is where real action is established.

Here

"Reality is the interest

169
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 302.
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in action, In existence."1
"
The ethical realm, in its subjectivity, its dialectic
of existence, and its action, demands "of every individual to
become an entire man."171 There must be a dialectical involvement of every aspect of the individual's personhoor..
The importance of thought has already been established.
Thought acknowledged the ideal and the abstract, but if
thought is made the sole ingredient of personhood, then the
individual loses himself in objectivity and ceases to exist.
"In existence thought is by no means Ligher than imagiration
and feeling, but coordinate."172

"The task is not to exalt

the one at the expense of the other, but to give them an
equal status, to unify them in simultaneity; the medium in
which they are unified is existence."173
engagement of the total man.

Ethics requires the

No aspect of the individual

can escape the demands that the ideal places before him.

All

these aspects are to be dialectically unified, and the medium
in which this unification takes place is passion.

"But pas-

sion first and last; for it is impossible to think about existence in existence without passion..174
170
Kierkegaard, Concluding.Unscientific Postscript,
P. 304.
171Ibid., p. 309.
172Ibid., p. 310.
173Ibid., p. 311.
174Ibid., p. 312.
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As a total man, the existing individual does not lose
the aesthetic realm.

Rather, he is able to give it its proper

value and incorporate it proportionately into his life.

The

ethical individual is first and foremost an existing subject.
This is the essence of who he is.

He may also be a poet, an

artist, a scholar, and even "an ethicist," but he is essentially an existing individual.

"The subjective thinker is

aesthetic enough to give his life aesthetic content, ethical
enough to regulate it, and dialectical enough to interpenetrate it with

thought.”175

Here in the ethical sphere the groundwork has been
laid from which the individual can continue in his striving
to become a Christian, which is the wnole point of Kierkegaard's authorship.

But in order to carry on in this endeavor,

the shortcomings of mere ethics must be realized.

The irony

undergirding the whole ethical pursuit lies in discovering
man's depravity, the fact that as a man he exists in a state
of error in spite of his desires to be ethical.

Socrates

realized man's limitations in attaining to the ideal, although
he did not classify man's condition in Christian terms.
"Because of his ethical insight, accordingly, he discovered
in himself a disposition for all sorts of evil .

The way

of the ethical becomes a very long one, for it begins with
176
first making this discovery."

In man's endeavor to become

ethical, he is only confronted with his inability to do so.
175Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 314.
176Ibid., P. 144.
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Ethics demands that he exist in self-contemplation and relate
all knowledge to himself essentially, but he only finds a
!arkened mind, a feeble will, and a depraved spirit."

It is

impossible to express with more intensive inwardness the
principle that subjectivity is truth, than when subjectivity
is in the first instance untruth, and yet subjectivity is the
truth."177

The subjectivity "In the first instance" is the

subjectivity discovered by ethical insight.

Yet this does

not mean that one is to return to the objective realm.

No,

the realm of subjectivity is truth but the content of this
realm cannot be mere ethics.

In this the groundwork is laid.

Upon making this discovery of ethical depravity in
one's self, the psychological response can be only one of despair.

Despair arises because all that the individual is

striving for, the ideal, is constantly evasive.

The ethical

man tries to find his true self in the ideal but his true
self can never be attained.

"However, a self, every instant

it exists, is in process of becoming, for the self 'kata
dynamin' (potentially) does not actually exist, it is only
that which it is to become.

In so far as the self does not

become itself, it is not its own self; but not to be one's
own self is

despair..178

The answer to the question —;;hat causes a man not to
be his own self?" is, of course, sin.

The Sickness Unto

Death, written by the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, is a magnificent
177Kierkegaard, Concludin- Unscientific Postscript,
p.191.
178 •
Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death,

D. 163.

94
treatise on the psychological ramifications of despair.

The

fact that the work is presented as "A Christian psychological
exposition for edification and awakening" supports my thesis
that Kierkegaard functions as a corrective author.

The work

describes the degrees to which a man can despair, or fail to
become a true self.

The self is described as a synthesis of

the infinite and the finite, the temporal and the eternal,
freedom and necessity.179

As a synthesis. the self is never

static, but is rather a dialectical becoming.
constituted by a relationships
to its self.

The self is

the relationship of the self

This relationship, if it is to be true, must

have God as its context.

The individual self is a real self

when he relates himself to himself before God.
This then is the formula which describes the condition
of the self when despair is completely eradicateds
by relating itself to its own self and by willing to
be itself the self is gcRiinded transparently in the
Power which posited it.i°
Anti-Climacus, the pseudonym who characterizes a
Christian to a superior degree, describes the manifold intensities of sin and despair.

He describes the "despair of

infinitude" where a man can become so caught up in abstractions, and vain imaginings that he becomes so "fantastical"
that he is unable to account for his actual, concrete existence
"Generally the fantastical is that which so carries a man out
into the infinite that it merely carries him away from himself
and therewith prevents him from returning to himself."181
179Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 146.
180 .
Ibid., p. 147.
181
Ibid., p. 164.
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The "fantastical" man lacks finitude, concreteness, actuality.
As a synthesis, he is unbalanced, tilting heavily to the infinite side.

But there is also the man whose scale tilts to

the finite side.
tude."

This man exemplifies the "despair of fini-

In this state, the man becomes so identified in the

worldly, the finite, the corporeal, that he loses any relationship to the eternal.

The despair of infinitude can cor-

respond easily to an aesthetic world-view, while the despair

of finitude can correspond to the ethical.
This is not to say that one should approach Kierkeraard with the stages of existences as his sole hermeneutical
tool.

Just as the ethical man can have aesthetic character-

istics, he may also suffer the despair of infinitude and still
be ethically existing.

The point is that the authorship of

Kierkegaard is not that which offers cut and dry systems.

Yet

the authorship does differentiate between various qualities,
qualities of existence and in Sickness Unto Death, qualities
of sin.

A single man can very well contain characteristics

which qualify his existence as aesthetic, ethical, and religious.

So too, he may suffer in varying intensities a number

of despairs that Anti-Climacus describes in this work.
Without itemizing each level of despair, perhaps a
general statement can be made.

"With every increase in the

degree of consciousness, and in proportion to that increase,
the intensity of despair increases; the more consciousness,
the more intense the despair..182

Taking into consideration

18
2Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, P. 175.
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the preceding paragraph, a subtle movement of the dialectical
can be perceived.

Kierkegaard, for the sake of correcting

the dire state of Christian living, sets out to explore what
it is to be human, and in so doing, he arranges his states
of existence.

These stases culminate in an existence eradi-

cated of despair; where the man relates himself to himself
before God.

This man can be seen as having an increased con-

sciousness, which increased as his existence became more
authentic as a relation to himself and to God.
dialectical subtltys

Here is the

an increased consciousness means that

a man moves closer to and farther from God at the same time.
The religious man's self consciousness is greater than the
ethical man's due to the religious man's relating himself to
God, but at the same time the religious man, being "closer"
to God has more of God to reject or despair of; therefore
his despair or sin is also greater

than the ethical man's.

Once the ethical man has recognized the despair which
results from exhausting the ethical sphere, he confronts that
boundary which has been classified as humor.

Just as irony

was the boundary between the aesthetic sphere and the ethical,
so too humor marks the dividing line between the ethical sphere
and the religious.

And, just as the presence of the ethical

sphere was necessary in order to define irony, the presence
of the religious sphere is necessary for the definition of
humor.

Irony, humo.', and the comical are essentially the same

in functions

they all serve to point out the contradictions

inherent in the lower spheres.

Their differences lie in the

content with which they deal, and the seriousness that their
respective contradictions imply.
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The comical is present in every stage of life (only
that the relative positions are different), for
wherever there is life, there is contradiction, and
wherever there is contradiction, the comical is present. The tragic and the comic are the same, in so far
as both are based on contradiction; but the tragic is
the suffering cpntradiction, the comical, the painless
contradiction. .o3
Humor differs from irony in its content.

Just as it

was ironical that the aesthete would trivialize the ethical
notion of duty, so too, the humorous trivializes the various
notions of religiosity.

Here it can be seen that the clergy-

men of the nineteenth century Danish Church are humorous or
comical.

They utilize the various concepts and terms of

Christianity while emptying them of their decisive significance.

This trivialization by the clergy is ironic, but

because the content verges on the religious sphere, the irony
becomes qualified as humor.

Humor "is only apparently dif-

ferent from irony through apparently having assimilated the
entire Christian position, but without having appropriated it
in a decisive manner (while the Christian position inheres in
184
the decision and the decisiveness)."

Humor seemingly

gives existence a greater significance because of its deceitfully covering itself with religious terms, but, in
actuality, humor still remains in the realm of the immanent
because it avoids decisiveness.

Humor borders ethics and

religion because it merely clothes ethics with religious
phraseology

but never attains to true religiosity.

183Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 459.
18
4Ibid., P• 2';2.
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.then humor uses Christian terminology (sin,the forgiveness of sins, atonement, God in time, etc.) it
is not Christianity, but a pagan speculation which
has acquired a knowledge of the Christian ideas. It
can come deceptively close to the Christian position;
but where decisiveness takes hold; where existence
captures the existing individual so that he must
remain in existence, while the bridge of immanence
and recollection is burned behind him; where the
decision comes to be in the moment, and the movement
is forward toward a relationship with the eternal
truth which came
to being in time: there humor
does not fo11ow.1°)
The boundaries, irony and humor, are only understood
once they have been crossed; they are only understood in
retrospect.

The contradictions inherent in each sphere of

existence can only be perceived in the sphere which has made
an advance upon the preceding sphere.
The lower can never make the higher comical, i.e.
it cannot legitimately apprehend the higher as
comical, and has not the power to make it comical
. . . The immediate consciousness has the comical
outside itself, for wherever there is life there
is contradiction, but the contradiction is not
represented in the immediate consciousness, which
therefore as the contradiction coming from the
outside 18
As such, the ethicist has irony as his "incognito"
and the religious man has humor as his "incognito.
"Incognito" can be understood as an inward perspective.

The

ethicist has crossed the boundary of irony and has therefore

p. 243.

185Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
186Ibid., P. 463
'
187Ibid., P. 454'
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incorporated the ironical into his perceptual framework.
can perceive the aesthetic contradictions as ironic.
same principle holds for the religious man.

He

The

He can perceive

the comedy that the ethicist performs in clothing his existence with religious concepts.

As an incognito, humor is

not something that the religious man can outwardly reveal.
Rather, humor is a device he utilizes to categorize the
qualities of life as they manifest their contradictions to
him.

As a religious man, his existence acquires religious

content and likewise his "essential knowledge."

Therefore

all of life takes on religious meaning to him.
Religiousness A
At just what point the ethical man becomes religious
is hard to pinpoint.

However, since the schema of stages

delineate qualities of existence, it seems apparent that
Religiousness A is qualitatively different from the ethical
sphere.

Although Judge William would maintain that he has a

God -concept, that he is ethical because he loves God, he is
actually in love with the idea of God, not God Himself.

The

nature of an idea is that it originates in man which makes it
part of the created order and an invalid object of worship.
And here is a point of differentiation between Religiousness A
and ethics&
worship.

Religiousness A strives to a more valid object of

I would venture to say that the God -concept of the

religious man has more transcendence, more holiness, more
omnipotence and sovereignty than that of the ethical.

How-

ever, I am not prepared to say that the God of Religiousness A
is God Himself either.

Rather, the quality of existence
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described as Religiousness A is a better approximation to
that quality of existence which is Christian.

Because of

the God -concept, the pathological character of the religious
man is also intensified beyond that of the merely ethical man.
The recognition of despair, coupled with a matured concept of
God, prompts the individual to become increasingly subjective.
7eligiosity is maintained by an act of the will whereby one resigns the relati'e telos inherent in the temporal
realm for the absolute telos of his "eternal happiness."
"The first genuine for the relationship to the absolute telos
188
is a total renunciation."

Resignation lea-es the individ-

ual facing, or makes him face, an eternal happiness as the
absolute telos."189

What is described in this quality of

existence is a 'pathos," a mind set of tremendous subjectivity which focuses totally on the relationship to the absolute.
The task is to exercise the absolute relationship to
the absolute telos, striving to reach the maximum
of maintaining simultaneously a relationship to the
absolute telos and to relative ends, not by mediating them, but by making the relationship to the absolute telos absolute, nd the relationship to the
10
relative ends relative.1'
The resignation of the individual is confined solely
to the subjective realm.

As such, the categories of the

moment and passion are strenuously intensified.

At every

moment, the religious man is to balance both of these relationships in his personal inward existence, "while remaining
18
8Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 326.
189Ib1d., p. 358.
190Ibid., p. 364.
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in the relativities of life."191

The task of striving for

this balance lastF, as long as the man lives.

For the reli-

gious man there is no room for what Climacus calls the womanish where one makes "a sacred promise, because the inner
weakness needs the strong stimulus of the moment."192

This

type of instant religion may serve to awaken a man to the
religious sphere, but it in no way qualifies his existence
as religious.'"

No, the religious man's religion is not

mrely based on one particular moment in his past when he
vowed a vow and felt the tingle of excitement run through his
body.

The religious man's religiosity is his own existence

where in his inwardness he maintains both an absolute relation to the absolute and a relative relation to the relative.
It is the relationship that constitutes religiosity.

The

individual is religious in his dialectical becoming, not in
claiming doctrines or in holding on to a vow or in pointing
to a time when he became "awakened."
Religiosity is, then, not something outwardly exhibited.

The religious man does not differentiate himself by

his clothes or his hair or his specific occupation.194

To ex-

press religiosity in dress is to trivialize the religious
sphere, and in this the humorous becomes apparent.
1

91Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,

p. 365.
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The individual does not cease to be a human being,
nor does he divest himself of the manifold composite
garment of the finite in order to clothe himself in
the abstract garment of the cloister. But he does
not mediate between the absolute telos and the finite
ends. In his immediacy the individual is rooted in
the finite. But wnen resignation has convinced itself
that he has acquired the absolute direction toward
the absolute telos, all is changed, and the roots have
been severed. He still lives in the finite, but he
does not have his life in the finite. His life has,
like that of other human beings, the various predicates
of a human existence, but he is in them as one who is
clothed in The borrowed garments of a stranger. He is
a stranger in the world of the finite, but does not
manifest his heterogeneity, his separation from worldliness, by a foreign mode of dress. This would be a
contraCiction, since he would thereby qualify himself
in a worldly manner. He is incognito, but his incognito copRists in having an appearance entirely like
others.
The condition of resignation is gained by an act of
the will.

Resignation is a courageous act which allows the

religious man to gain an eternal consciousness.196

In this,

resignation is not to be confused with faith in the Christian
sense.

It must be remembered that faith is a condition given

by Christ; no man can will himself into Christian faith.
For the act of resignation faith is not required,
for what I gain by resignation is my eternal consciousness, and this is a purely philosophical movement which I dare say I am able to make if it is required, and which I can train myself to make, for
whenever any finiteness would get the mastery over me,
I starve myself until I can make the movement, for my
eternal consciousness is my love to God, and for me
this is higher than everything . . . In resignation I
make renunciation of everything, this movement I make
by myself, and if I do not make it, it is because I
am cowardly and effeminate and without enthusiasm and
do not feel the significance of the lofty dignity
which is assigned to every man, that of being his

p. 367.

195Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
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own censor . . . This movement I make by myself,
and what I gain is myself in my eternal consciousness,
in blisRful agreement with my love for the Eternal
Being.17
Eternal consciousness is not to be confused with salvation in the Christian sense.

Eternal consciousness arises

from man, but salvation is of God.

As the offense described

in Philosophical Fragments is an "acoustic illusion," possibly eternal consciousness is an illusion as well.

It would

appear that the consciousness of the eternal came from the
"Eternal Being," but this is not the case.

The existence of

the man of Religiousness A does not have revelation as a
determining factor.

Therefore his eternal consciousness is

still within the realm of immanence, or creation.

Only when

the man's existence is qualified by the revelation of God in
Christ will his eternal consciousness be made complete in the
hope of salvation.

But here, where Johannes de Silentio says,

"my eternal consciousness is my love to God, and for me this
is higher than everything," we can see the source of the
paradox which arises at the end of Religiousness A.

Reli-

giousness A is within immanence; Religiousness B is revelatory.

The relationship between immanence and revelation is

constituted in Christ and it appears as the paradox marking
the limit between Religiousness A and B.
Despite this paradox which hovers in the distance of
Religiousness A, there is a certain peace and satisfaction
which is gained in acquiring an eternal consciousness.

By

willing to relate to one's absolute telos, "there is peace
19
7Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 59.
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and

rest."1 '98
The exercise of the absolute distinction makes life
absolutely strenuous, precisely when the individual
remains in the finite an simultaneously maintains
an absolute relationship to the absolute telos and
a relative relationship to the relative. But in the
strenuous exertion there is nevertheless a tranquillity and a peace; for absolutely, or with all one's
strength, and with renunciation of everything else,
to maintain a relationship to the absolute telos is
no contradiction, but is the absolute correspondence
of like to like.
Because Religiousness A is fundamentally a patholo-

gical stage, great emphasis is placed on willing "with all
one's strength, and with renunciation of everything else."
This pathos qualifies the relationship to the "absolute
telos" as "absolute;" therefore, there is "correspondence of
like to like."

If the "absolute telos" is God, and the pathos

or existence is absolutely offered by man, then the "like to
like" can imply the doctrine of creation.

Because man is,

in fact, a creature made in the image of God, his mere striving to relate himself absolutely to God will yield a certain
peace of mind.

He is in the image of God and this striving

will produce a semblance of harmony with that which is eternal in himself.

There is not only the "fought the good

fight" kind of peace, but the "draw nigh unto God and He will
draw nigh to you" kind of peace.
So then, by an act of will, the religious man has
taken the power away from immediacy by exercising nimself in
total renunciation whereby his eternal consciousness is
198
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 56.
199
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
P. 377.
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gained.

But "even when the individual has brought his im-

mediacy into subjection, with his victory he is still in existence, and thereby again prevented from expressing absolutely the absolute relationship to an absolute telos."200

Here,

then, is the strenuousness of existence which is only met
in the religious sphere.

In this the major characteristic

of religiosity is revealed; "the distinguishing mark of
religious action is suffering..201
But essential existential pathos is essentially
related to existence; and to exist essentially is
inwardness, and action in inwardness is suffering,
for the individual cannot make himself over, any
such attempt, like limitation, a mere affectation,
and it is for this reason tha. §uffering is the
highest action in inwardness.'
'
-0
The ethical man was driven into the religious stage because of
his realization that he could not "make himself over," but
here, in Religiousness A, this inability now marks him as a
religious man, if, in fact, this suffering is incorporated
into his subjectivity.

As existing in existential suffering,

"religiosity begins to breathe."203

Existential suffering is

necessary to religiosity, so much so that the religious man
seeks to identify himself as a sufferer.204

In this identi-

fication joy can be found205 because his suffering is
.
2Mnerkegaard, Concluding. Unscientific Postscript,
P. 386.
2011bid., p.
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evidence that he is involved in seeking a Cod-re1ationsh1p.206
But at the same time that an individual suffers religiously, he cannot in his joy over the significance
of the suffering as a mark of the relationship transcend the suffering; for the suffering is rooted in
the fact that he is separated from his happiness, but
also signifies that he has a relationship to this
happiness, so that t9 be without suffering means to
be without religion.4°7
Therefore the task of the religious man is to maintain
his existence in a state of existential suffering; he must
constantly allow suffering to persist "as essential for the
pathetic relationship to an eternal happiness..208

Religious-

ness A is "pathetic" in that it constitutes the pathos of
the individual.

The religious man cannot view suffering as

accidental, as would the aesthete."
2
Existential suffering
is purely subjective and must be constantly present as the
essential expression for religiousness.

"The significance

of the religious suffering is that it is a dying away from
immediacy; its reality consists in its essential persistence;
but it belongs to the inwardness of a man, and must not express itself outwardly, as in the monastic movement..210
It should be remembered that religious suffering
designates inwardness, and subjectivity.
sion verges on asceticism.
being ascetic.

Any outward expres-

Kierkegaard is often regarded as

Take into consideration that Climacus is

20
6Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
lo• 405.
p. 406.
P. 396
p. 400
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466.
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describing the suffering and that the intent of the description is therapeutic.

It is not Christianity which is being

discussed but a quality of existence, a world -life -view which
only pathologically resembles the quality of Christian existence.

Climacus is describing a pathos which does appear

susceptible to asceticism, but not if one maintains the
absolute subjective relationship to the absolute telos.
Religious suffering is always inwardness.

Loss of fortune,211

financial loss, anything lost accidentally does not constitute
religious suffering.
Suffering as a dying away from immediacy is thus not
flagellations and the like; it is not self torture.
For the self -torturer does not by any means express
that he can do nothing before God, for 4 sounts his
acts of self-torture as being something.
This is the reason that the religious man sufferst
he can do nothing before God.

All his deeds, all his desires,

all his personal characteristics are nothing before God.
Hence, he suffers.

In such a state of impotence before God

it is very likely that the religious man could despair of the
value of suffering.

Even though his suffering is the essen-

tial expression for his God -relationship, he can become tempted
to lose himself in his impotence, rather than view it as the
negative manifestation for a positive God -relationship.
term "Anfechtung" describes such a temptation.

The

"Anfechtung

is in the sphere of the God -relationship what temptation is
21
1Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 389.
212
Ib1d., p. 414.
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in the ethical sphere.,,213

"Anfechtung" arises as a tempta-

tion for a religious man who is strongly establishing his God relationship.

"Anfechtung" signals that limit which marks the

absolute difference between God and man, and the temptation
is to despair in face of that limit.

What is happening here

is that the man is coming closer and closer to attaining to
a completely total renunciation of the immediate realm,
which would include a completely total renunciation of himself as well.

This process is necessary in order to confront

God Himself in Hi.. revelation in Christ.

But as the process

gains momentum as the individual moves through Religiousness
A, "Anfechtung" appears to "frighten him back,.214 and cause
him to remain in despair over his nothingness.

But in order

for the true Christian Cod -relationship to be established,
man's nothingness must be seen in negative relation to the
positive God-relationship.215
In the religious sphere the realization of impotency
is not a matter of mere self-knowledge.
be no advance upon the ethical sphere.
is rather a matter of God-knowledge.

Otherwise there would
The impotency here

By moving into the

religious sphere, the individual is confronted with his notion
of God, and it is this knowledge as it is transformed into
"essential knowledge" which ultimately brings him to nothing.
213Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 410.
21
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What the conception of God or an eternal happiness
is to effect in the individual is, that he transform
his entire existence in relation thereto, and this
transformation is a process of dying away from the
immediate. This is slowly brought about, but finally he will feel himself confined within the absolute
conception of God; for the absolute conception of God
does not consist in having such a conception en
passant, but consists ir having the absolute conception at every moment. This is the check on his
immediacy,. the death verdict which announces its annihilation.41c
The religious man lies in the finite as a helpless
child; he desires absolutely to hold fast to the conception, and precisely this annihilates him.417
In Religiousness A, the term used to signify man's
impotence before God i

guilt.

Because this discovery of

guilt is found in a determination of one's God -relationship,
guilt takes on qualitative value, not quantitative.

"Put

together with the comparative as a standard, the guilt becomes
quantitative;

confronted with the absolute quality, the guilt
becomes qualitative."218 Guilt becomes a total determinant

for the whole of the religious man's existence.
is not with external deeds.

The concern

When one is in a state of total

guilt, a particular deed may be deemed innocent, but, again,
this has nothing to do with the condition of the subjective
existence of the individual.

Just because a man is able to

perform an innocent deed does not imply that he does not exist
in a total state of guilt.

The deed is measured on a compara-

tive scale, but the existence is measured against the absolute
21
6Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
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holiness of God, and confronted with this absolute measurement, man can only be viewed as guilty.

"The totality of

guilt comes into being for the individual when he puts his
guilt together with the relation to an eternal happiness."219
For his consciousness is that he is decisively changed.
whereas nevertheless the identity of the subject consists in the fact that it is he himself whc becomes
consciousness by putting guilt together with the relationship to an eternal happiness. But still he is related to an eternal happiness, and tie consciousness of
guilt is a higher expression of this than is suffering.220
The concept of guilt as a total determinant is found
only in the realm of the religious and only after the individual has accepted the ramifications that his existential
suffering has in relation to his eternal happiness.221

"The

totality of guilt-consciousness in the particular individual
before God in relation to an eternal happiness is religious.222
ness.

Religiousness B
Religiousness A, as it has been thus described, must
be seen as a "pathetic" preparation for entering into Religiousness B which is "pathetic-dialectic."223

Religiousness A

has its own dialectic, or movement, but it is not paradoxical.
Its dialectic is the dialectic of inward appropriation of the
relationship to an eternal happiness.
21

As such, it establishes
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for the individual a pathos which brings him to the threshold
of Christian faith.

The infinite resignation is the last

stage prior to faith, so that one who has not madethis move224
ment has not faith."

Religiousness A is a frame of mind

which has intensified the foundational categories of subjectivity which were first laid in the ethical stage.

Religious-

ness B is more paradoxically dialectic in that it accentuates
this pathos into a new quality by relating to the existence
of God in time, i.e. Christ.

Religiousness A is, therefore,

not specifically Christian, but ?,eligiousness B incorporates
225
this pathos to create a qualitatively new pathos.
Religiousness A is by no means undialectic, but it is
not paradoxically dialectic. Religiousness A is the
dialectic of inward transformation; it is the relation
to an eternal happiness which is not conditioned by
anything but is the dialectic inward appropriation of
the relationship, and so is conditioned only by the
inwardness of appropriation and its dialectic.
Religiousness B . . . does on the contrary posit
conditions, of such a sort that they are not merely
deeper dialectical apprehensions of inwardness, but
are a definite something which defines more closely
the eternal happiness (whereas in A the only closer
definitions are the closer definitions of inward apprehension), not defining more closely the individual
apprehension of it, but defining more closely the
eternal happiness itself, though not as a task for
thought, bu;,,paradoxically as a repellent to produce
new pathos.'-s°
That which is paradoxically repellent in Religiousness B is
its dialectical relation to Christ.

Christ is the distin-

guishing characteristic of Religiousness B and He is the
224
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cAuse of offense.

This offensiveness must be overcome and

Christ appropriated.

Without Christ, Religiousness 9 is

Religiousness A which is immediacy.

"Religiousness A can

exist in paganism, and in Christianity it can be the religiousness of everyone who is not decisively Christian,
no,“227
whether he be baptized or
That Religiousness A can exist in paganism, or in
immanence, does not mean that it offers no measure of edification to the individual.

Its edification is found in

its intensified subjectivity, revealing the totality of guiltconsciousness where the self is annihilated before God.228
In Religiousness B the edifying originates from the outside
of the individual, not from the God -relationship pu se.
This constitutes the paradoxical nature of Religiousness B,
in that by relating to something outside himself, an external,
there appears to be a reversion back to an aesthetic relationship.

"The paradoxical edification corresponds therefore

to the determination of God in time as the individual man:
for if such be the case, the individual is related to some .229
thing outside himself.”
Here then is the boundary of contradiction or paradox
that separates Religiousness A from 9:
Christ.

the Absolute Paradox,

Up to this point, the boundaries between the spheres
227
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have been mere contradictions, but now the boundary that marks
the entrance to 7hristianity is an absolute paradox, an absurdity.

Man has been able to utilize his understanding in

immanence all the way through each of the spheres of existence up to this point.

Now, in confrontation with Christ,

the understanding has to be relinquished, as Climacus describes in Philosophical Fragments. Now the individual is
called upon to believe against the understanding, by using
the understanding to make sure he believes against the understanding.230
The dialectical aspect of the problem requires
thought-passion - not to want to understand it, but
to understand what it means to break thus with the
understanding and with thinking and with immanence,
in order to lose the last foothold of immanence,
eternity behind one, and to exist constantly on the
extreg4qt verge of existence by virtue of the absurd.4}1
The absurdity is that God has become Man, i.e. the
Gospel.

This gives an historicity to Religiousness B that

Religiousness A does not have.
torical starting point.232

Religiousness A has no his-

But not so with Religiousness B

which is based on the historical moment that God became man
in Christ.
The contradiction ist
to base one's eternal happiness
upon an approximation, a thing which can be done only
when one has in oneself no eternal determinant (and
that again is no more possible to think than how such
a notion could occur to anyone, since the Deity must
provide the condition for it), and hence this again
230Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 504.
231Ibid., P. 505.
232Ibid., p. 508.
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is connectg0 with the paradoxical accentuation of
existence.L,
3
Because of the "condition" given to the individual by
Christ, the Christian attains a new pathos which proportionately incorporates all of the preceding stages of existence.
This new pathos is characterized in three areas.

The first

is the transformation of guilt-consciousness into sinconsciousness.

Sin-consciousness cannot be gained by the

234
individua1
apart from the "condition," which is the Holy
Spirit.

This consciousness is not an object of thought, but

is a consciousness which concerns the total man and, as such,
reveals that the man has become a new creature.

The second

quality of this new pathos is the realization of being offended in Christ.

This quality brings to the fore the ever-

present possibility of disobedience to Christ and the serious
ramifications which are then brought to bear on the individual's existence.

The third quality is the "smart of sympathy"

which intensifies the Christian's individuality in regard to
other men.

In Religiousness A, there exists a "fellow -feeling"

for other men because this religiousness relates to an eternal
that is present in all men.235

But in Religiousness B, the

eternal that is related to the Eternal in time which marks a
breach with the realm of immanence in which Religiousness A
is confined.

The Christian pathos is so adverse to the

233
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immanent realm that this "fellow-feeling" is transformed into
the smart of sympathy which is so strong that it can be classified as hate.

Just as Christ told his disciples that if

any man were to be His disciple, he would hate his father and
mother and sister and brother.

The only fellow-feeling a

Christian can have is with other Christians.

This is not

to say that the Christian doesn't desire to love his fellow
man, but that his relationship to Christ takes on such absolute characteristics that all other relationships can be
viewed as diametrically in opposition.

The Christian "can

unto the very last desire to do everything for

his fellow

man' with the greatest enthusiasm (Christianity does not exclude such behavior when it bids us hate), and yet when these
terms separate them, they separate them forever - is not
this as though he hated them?"236
By delving into these various stages or qualities of
existence, Kierkegaard hopes to present the schema so that the
reader will recognize himself as having a certain quality to
his existence.

Here is the focus of correction, for once an

individual becomes aware that existence is qualitative, he
must then concern himself with existing.

Existence becomes

something he wants to get better at, or he begins to want for
himself the best existence which would relate to his concern
for eternal happiness.

But correction is further emphasized

in the fact that the only existence meriting eternal happiness
is Christ's.

Kierkegaard, by revealing aestheticism, ethics,

236Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript.,
p. 519.
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and Religiousness A, shows the futility of the Socratic dictum "know Thyself."

For edification, he guides the reader

through each quality level until quality exhausts itself in
Religiousness A and the reader is aware of man's nothingness
before God.

If the reader is not corrected in this fashion,

he would continue to "know himself" and try to present himself as something before God.

But he needs correction.

He

needs to take his faith away from immediacy, the created
order, and he needs to place it solely on God and His revelation.

To meet God in His revelation is to meet God in

Christ.

Such a meeting requires the faith which is "the

objective uncertainty due to the repulsion of the absurd
held fast by the passion of inwardness, which in this instance
is intensified to the utmost degree."237

CHAPTER III
COMMENTS ON KIERYMAARD'S CORRECTIVE
TREATMENT OF CHRIST
God
The stages of existence are not depicting a type of
ladder to Christianity.

Even though the stages can be thought

of as being "pre-Christian," they are only so in the sense of
being lower or lesser qualities of existence.

The presenta-

tion of the stages does not imply that one must begin living
as an aesthete, then an ethicist, and then be religious in
order to become a Christian.

Instead, the stages serve to

outline three major world -views and their corresponding lifestyles for the purpose of correction, not evangelization.
Because of the maieutic element, the reader will naturally
identify with a certain quality of existence.

The correction

lies th the fact that the reader's existence is seen in relation to Christ's existence.

The controlling question, "how

do I become a Christian?" constantly brings the focus of the
stages to the junction of Religiousness A and Religiousness B
where the absurdity of God as Man lies.
It is ironic that Religiousness B, the existence of a
Christian, is the highest level of existence and yet, as a
stage in the schema, less is said about Religiousness B than
any other stage.

The presence of such indirectness is not
117
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surprising.

In fact, knowing Kierkegaard, the indirectness

is a clue to the importance of Religiousness B.

The reason

that the Christian existence is so indirectly presented is
due to that contradiction which marks the boundary between
Religiousness A and Es

Christ.

The entire scope of Chris-

tian existence is therefore qualified by the appropriation
of Christ into one's existence.

In Kierkegaard, one does not

confront a theological Christology.

Rather, Christ is treated

in corrective fashion and seen only in relation to the individual's appropriation of Him into his existence.

We must

keep in mind that Kierkegaard's treatment of Christ is part
of his corrective project, and so cannot be separated from
his treatment of the existence of the believer.
Before we discuss Kierkegaard's treatment of Christ,
it would be best to offer a preliminary discussion of his concept of God.

We have already seen how the concept of God is

involved in man's worship and the view that the individual
takes concerning himself.

Again, Kierkegaard's treatment of

God is not a doctrinal statement.

Kierkegaard does not try

to tell the reader something about God that he doesn't know.
Rather, God is dealt with in such a fashion that the reader
is called upon to relate to his knowledge of God received from
the Church, the Scriptures, and the fact that he is created
in the image of God.

Kierkegaard's treatment of God has the

sole purpose of bringing the individual's existence into relation to God.

Also, his treatment of God serves to prepare

the individual to confront God in the person of Jesus Christ.
In this light, the absolute qualitative difference between
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God and man is constantly emphasized.

In fact, the usage

of the levels of existence is an indirect method to confront
the reader with this realization.

As the individual gains

quality in his existence, he also gains the realization that
he can attain to nothing before God.

Consequently, the first

239
step toward Christianity is a fear of God.
Kierkegaard's whole method of indirect communication
can be seen as God -honoring, because God is Himself the
Master of the maieutic art.

Kierkegaard's treatment of God

centers largely on the fact that He is hidden and very dif240
ficult to know.

In the whole history of revelation God

has not directly confronted man, but has consistently used
indirect means to reveal Himself.

"For no anonymous author

can more cunningly conceal himself, no practitioner of the
maieutic art can more carefully withdraw himself from the
direct relationship, than God.

u241

By not realizing God's

hidden omnipresence, one succumbs to the notion of mediation
242
and falls prey to paganism.

God is not subject to proof;

rather He is the object of faith.

God exists for the indi-

vidual only as a faith presupposition.'

It is pure comedy
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to attempt to prove God's existence for God must exist at the
beginning of the proof.

The only way to "prove" God's exis-

tence is in one's own existence, by submission to God in His
revelation, on His terms.244
The only attributes of God which Kierkegaard discusses are Love245 and wi1l.246 Even his essay, "The Unchangeableness of God,' where the omnipotence, invisibility,
sovereignty and transcendence of God are discussed, the focus
crystalizes on the individual's existence before such a God.247
By treating God in such a fashion, Kierkegaard does not contradict Scripture in any way.

Rather, by his treatment of

God, the individual can be brought to a place where he can
confront the most direct, yet the most indirect, revelation
of Gods

Jesus Christ.
Historical Approach
Kierkegaard presents this treatment of God solely for

the purpose of correction.

Kierkegaard does not want to

correct one's theology, or how one defines "God."

Rather, he

wants to correct one's existence in relation to God, or how
one approaches God.

The approach which Kierkegaard opposes

is that which seeks to reach God directly or immanently.

Such

an approach to God's revelation in Christ utilizes man's speculative powers hoping to define Christ historically.

The

24
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historical approach maintains that with the proper historical
perspective, the true Christ will appear.

We have seen how

this mindset results from the notion of mediation and the
tendency to objectivity.

Philosophical Fragments satirizes

this approach by asking how an historical event could have
any bearing on one's eternal happiness.

Speculation feels

that if it can merely identify or historically define the
event, i.e. Christ, then the eternal happiness is secured.
But Kierkegaard shows the futility of defining an historical
event and secures eternal happiness in one's faith relationship to God.

Mere historical definition cannot suffice to

secure one's eternal happiness.

"If the inquirer were in-

finitely interested in behalf of his relationship to the
doctrine he would at once despair; for nothing is more
readily evident than that the greatest attainable certainty
with respect to anything historical is merely an approxima248
tion.
The historical approach limits itself to the created
realm or immanence.

There is no room for revelation which

does not adhere to the laws of creation.

The problem that

the historical approach hopes to overcome is that of doubt.
But doubt is not the problem that Kierkegaard battles; disobedience is the problem.

Disobedience is overcome by obed-

iently relating to God by faith; by accepting and acting upon
the revelation found in Scriptures and in Christ.

The ap-

proach of Biblical Criticism is of no benefit to the individual seeking to become a Christian.
248
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Anyone who posits inspiration, as a believer does,
must consistently consider every critical deliberation, whether for or againtos as a mis-direction, a
temptation for the spirit.''
More than this it is impossible to say, for inspiration is an object of faith and subject to a qualitative dialectic; it is incapab;e of being reached by
a quantitative approximation.-5°
Faith can never be confused with knowledge; revelation can
never be confused with 5mmanence.
The historical approach confuses the authority inherent in God's revelation.

It is hoped that by offering

historical validity, God's revelation will become less doubtful.

But God is not helped by historians and doubt is not

overcome by speculation.

Yet those who approach Christ

historically hope to offer some information which would make
God's revelation authoritative for one's life.

Often the

history of the Church is offered as proof of God's activity
in Christ.

It is thought that since the Scriptures are often

doubtful, the historical evidence of the Church can bolster
Christ's faltering authority.

But the `'hurch, with all its

confessions, traditions, baptisms, and sacraments merely
falls under the category of immanence.

Therefore the approacl

to Christ solely in terms of the historical evidences provided
by the Church must also be rejected.
In no way can it be concluded from this that Kierkegaard rejects the Bible or that he rejects the function of
the Church.

:That he rejects is the misuse of authority which

249
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results from approaching Christ via historical evidences or
Biblical Criticism.

Giving absolute authority to relative

authorities is the confusion being corrected here.

The

eternal authority in Christ must be first established before
thetemporal, historical authorities of the Bible and the
Church.251

"Christ as the God -Man is in possession of the

specific quality of authority which no eternity can mediate
and put Christ on the same plane with the essential human
252
Christ therefore taught with authority.

quality.

"This

divine authority is possessed only by Him, Jesus Christ, whose
love hides the multitude of sins."253

The misuse of authority

in regard to the Bible and the Church only serve to obscure
the divine authority of Christ.
Within the category the category of subjective faith,
the Bible now becomes a "mirror" to be read as a "love letter."254

In the realm of objectivity, the Bible loses its

authority and its implications for the individual.

"People

treat Scriptures so scientifically that they might as well
be anonymous writings."255

Within the category of subjective

faith, the Church becomes the Body of Christ in which the
believer gains nourishment and exercises his gifts in relation to other believers.

Again, all of this clarification

251
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concerning the Bible and the Church are in complete accordance with Kierkegaard's corrective method, and serve to free
the individual from relative restraints in order to meet the
absolute authority of God in Christ.

Kierkegaard, in writing

"without authority," offers his authorship as an indirect
signpost to the authority of Christ.
Christ
The presentation of Christ to the reader emphasizes
certain aspects of Christ over others.

Many evangelicals

criticize Kierkegaard for not talking more about the atonement or the resurrection, for example.

But these criticisms

are unnecessary when Kierkegaard is seen as a corrective.
His writings are necessarily one-sided.

It must be remembered

that Kierkegaard does not offer a theological Christology.
Only those aspects of Christ which directly relate to the
barriers against Christianity are emphasized.
Possibly the most frequent way that Kierkegaard presents Christ is through the category of paradox.

At the bor-

der between the different stages of existence, one finds different intensities of contradiction:
Christ.

irony, humor, and

Christ is the paradox which marks the entrance into

Religiousness B or Christiarity.

Climacus introduces us to

Christ as a paradox in the third chapter of Philosophical
Fragments.

The fact that Christ is treated as a paradox

shows that Climacus is confronting the reader's inclination
to approach Christ historically through speculation.

Specu-

lation, or Reason, seeks to know truth, which implies that
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truth lies beyond or apart from Reason, in the "unknown."
Therefore, Reason seeks the "unknown."
this seeking as being passionate.

Climacus qualifies

"But the highest pitch of

every passion is always to will its own downfall; and so it is
also the supreme passion of the Reason to seek a collision,
though this collision must in one way or another prove its
undoing.

The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt

to discover something that thought cannot think..256

Later,

Climacus sophistically says "3o let us call this unknown
somethings

the God."257

The reason Reason, or Logic, confronts an unknown is
because logic only operates within a Fpecific world-view.

A

world-view is specified by the assumptions or presuppositions
that are accepted.
faith.

Such an acceptance can be called an act of

Cod, and His revelation of Himself in Christ, are to

be accepted by faith.

One cannot demand proof of God's exis-

tence or Christ's identity.

"In beginning my proof I pre-

suppose the ideal interpretation, and also that I will be successful in carrying it through; but what else is this but to
presuppose that the God exists, so that I really begin by
virtue of confidence in him?"258

God is not included in one's

thoughts or Reason until He is first accepted by faith.

Then

He can become the presupposition which structures the movement of logic.
256Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 46.
257Ibid., p. 49.
258Ibid., P.
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Christ, as the unknown, marks the limit to man's
•

Reason, just as He marks the boundary between Religiousness A
and B.

Basically, Christ delineates the border between the

created order, or immanence, and the Creator's order, or
revelation.

The difference between these two orders is ab-

solute.
From this there would seem to follow the further consequence, that if man is to receive any true knowledge
about the Unknown (the God) he must be made to know
that it is unlike him, absolutely unlike him. This
knowledge the Reason cannot possibly obtain of itself; we have already seen that this would be a selfcontradiction. It will therefore have to obtain this
knowledge from the God.259
Man, being in sin, cannot of himself know God.

God must give

knowledge of Himself to the individual.
The mere fact that God's revelation in Christ is something extraneous to Reason does not make Christ paradoxical.
Rather, Christ is paradoxical because He is man and He is
God.

"That God existed in human form, has been born, grown

up, and so forth, is surely the paradox sensu strictissimo,
.,260
the absolute paradox.

"The paradox consists principally

in the fact that God, the Eternal, came into existence in
time as a particular man."261

Christ is a paradox because

He is a contradiction, something unreasonable.

Christ can

also be said to be absurd.
259Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 57.
260Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript.,
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4hat now is the absurd? The absurd is - that the
eternal truth has come into being in time, that God
has come into being, has been born, has grown up,
and so forth, precisely like any other individual
human beinar,quite indistinguishable from other individuals..")4
Christ, as the absurd, must become the object of one's faith.
The absurdity of Christ serves to intensity the individual's
inward passion which appropriates Christ's existence into
his.263
Faith provides the individual with a new understanding in face of the absurdity of Christ.

This new understand-

ing is a dialectical inversion to man's natural understanding,
"for in connection with the absolute paradox the only understanding possible is that it cannot be understood."264
Another corrective maneuver of Kierkegaard's whereby Christ appears as a "seeming contradiction" is his emphasis
on the humiliation and the lowliness of Christ's life on
earth.

Just as the Jews of Jesus' day expected the Messiah

to come in glory, we often gravitate toward a triumphant
Christ rather than a suffering Christ.

But as we saw from

the stages, suffering is a vital characteristic of religious
pathos.

The pathos of suffering is emphasized by Kierkegaard

and exemplified by Christ.

As a corrective, Kierkegaard em-

phasizes the lowliness of Christ so that the believer is
always aware of having to "work out his salvation with fear
and trembling."

Kierkegaard presents Christ as our Pattern,

.
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our example.

What is exemplified is Christ's quality of

existence, His perfect obedience.

But too often we are

oriented to the loftier aspects of Christ and we forget that
life is a test, that existence is a striving.

Kierkegaard's

emphasis on Christ's person and existence correlates to his
goal of answering what it is to become a Christian.
Christian Existence
Not only does Kierkegaard present Christ as a paradox, but the existence of the Christian is also paradoxical,
in that he acquires Christian quality or becomes Christ-like.
Even "existence is paradoxically accentuated for the reason
that the eternal itself came into the world at a moment of
time..265
Human life itself can never be the same because
God became a man.

This "accentuated" form of existence is

not immediately transferred to all human beings, but only to
the believer, and in this transformation, the believer becomes
a new creature whose existence patterns the paradoxical nature
of Christ.
And the paradox itself did not last throughout many
yearst
it existed when Christ lived, and since then
it has existed only whenever someop was offended
and someone did in truth believe.'The entire corpus of the Christian's life is paradoxical, including his Scripture and his Church.
To the realm of immanence the Christian's existence is
paradoxical because he relates himself to the existence of
265
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Christ.

For men who operate under Socratic definitions, this

is certainly an absurdity, for how can one man's existence be
anything more than a mere occasion for intensified selfknowledge?

"To ask with infinite interest about a reality

which is not one's own, is faith, and this constitutes a
267
paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical."

Here, too,

is "the dialectical" whereby the reality of the believer is
related to the reality of Christ; the absolute nothingness of
the individual engaged in an appropriation of the absolute
everythingness of Christ.

It should be remembered here that

"reality" is not the historical occurrence, but the existence,
the person of Christ is meant.
The object of faith is the reality of another, and
the relationship is one of infinite interest. The
object of faith is not a doctrine, for then the relationship would be intellectual, and it would be of
importance not to botch it, but to realize the maximum
intellectual relationship. The object of faith is
not a teacher with a doctrine; for when a teacher has
a doctrine, the doctrine is eo ipso more important
than the teacher, and the relationship is again intellectual, and it again becomes important not to botch
it, but to realize the maximum intellectual relationship. The object of faith is the reality of the teacher, that the teacher really exists . . . The object
of faith is hence the reality of the God -man in the
sense of his existence. But existence involves first
and foremost particularity, and this is why thought
must abstract from existence, because the particular
cannot be thought, but only the universal. The object
of faith is thus God's reality in existence as a particular individual, the fact that God has existed as
an individual human being . . . If Christianity were
a doctrine, the relationship to it would not be one
of faith, for only an intellectual type of relationship can correspond to a doctrine. Christianity is
therefore not a doctrine, but the fact that the God
has existed . . . The maximum of attainment within
267
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the sphere of faith is to becomg,infinitely interested
in the reality of the teacher.2°8
The situation whereby the believer confronts the object
of his faith is one of contemporaneity.

This category was

developed in Philosophical Fragments to determine that there
is no essential difference between the eye -witness of the
historical Christ and the "disciple at second hand."

The

category of contemporaneity is a category of faith whereby
the believer confronts the actual existence of God as man.
As described in Philosophical Fragments this confrontation
can only occur when the "condition" of faith is given to the
individual by Christ.

Kierkegaard uses this category as a

corrective in order to bring the individual to the place
where Christ's person, His existence, can have decisive significance for the existence of the believer.

The possibility

of one becoming contemporary with Christ lies in the fact
that Christ's true identity as God is not something which is
revealed in the historical sense.

Therefore, "contemporary"

is not to be understood in terms of history, as if the individual were expected somehow to transfer himself back in time
to the days of Christ.

,ihat one is to be contemporary with

is an absolute truth, that Christ is God.

This truth does

not reveal itself in history, nor in the common usage of the
word "contemporary," for many men saw Christ and spoke to
Him but nevertheless were not contemporary with Him as God.
As God, Christ stands beyond mere time constituting what
268
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Kierkegaard calls "sacred history."

Because sacred history

is eternal, it is present for every generation.

Hence, the

passage of time cannot inhibit the individual from being contemporary with Christ.
And as Christ is the absolute, it is easy to see that
with respect to Him there is only one situation; that
of contemporaneousness. The five, the seven, the fifteen, the eighteen hundred years are neither here nor
there; they do not change Him, neither do they in any
wise reveal who He was, for who He was is revealed
only to fa1th.269
And thus every man can be contemporary only with the
age in which he lives - and then with one thing more;
with Christ's life on earth; for Christ's life on earth,
sacrea history, stands for itself alone outside history.47°
The category of contemporaneity is one of the imagination as
well.

One must put himself in the situation where he could

meet a particular man, talk with hi, eat with him, watch him
sleep, and allow him to excuse himself to empty his bowels,
and then, in a conversation, hear that man say, "I and the
Father are one."

In this, one has met Christ's aotual exis-

tence and has been privy to the eternal truth that Christ was
God.

In such a situation, one is confronted with an absolute

eitler-or; either one accepts the condition of faith, or one
is offended and rejects the identity that Christ claims with
God.
However, the contemporaneousness here in question
is not the contemporaneousness of an apostle, but
is merely the contemporaneousness which everyone who
lived in Christ's time had, the possibility in the
270
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in the tension of contemporanuysness of being offended, or of grasping faith.41
What is offensive is the absolute authority revealed
in the particular existence of this particular man.
The divine authority is the category, and here quite
rightly the sign of it is
the possibility of offense.
For a genius may very well at one time or another in
the course of 50 or 100 years cause aesthetically a
shock, but never ethically can he cause an offense,
for the offense is that a man possesses divine
authority . . . The question is quite simples
will
you obey? or will you not obey? Will you bow in
faith before his divine authority? Or will you be
offended? Or will you perhaps take no side? Beware!
This is also offense.27Z
That such authority should manifest itself in human form is a
thing which is so far beyond man's natural conception of
humanity that "he is unable to get it into his head."273
Offense "is Christianity's defense against all speculation..274
Offense is that unhappy relationship spoken of in Philosophical
Fragments, it is "unhappy admiration," and "envy..275
the rejection by tile total man of Christ as God.

It is

The intel-

lect is not what rejects, the imagination is not what rejects,
nor is it the feeling which rejects, but it is the will which
balks at grasping faith and desires instead to hold to the imnanent.

The will rebels and the offense is echoed throughout

the total composition of the man.
271Kierkegaard, Allthoritv and Revelation, p. 63.
272Ibid., pp. 25-26.
273Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 214.
274
Ibid.
275Ibid., p. 216.

133
In the Appendix to chapter three of Philosophical
Fragments, Climacus says that when the Paradox and human
reason meet in an understanding of their unlikeness, the encounter is happy.

If they meet in such a way that Reason

merely sees the Paradox as a limit, as something not unlike
itself, as something it can eventually attain to, the encounter is unhappy.
happy is offense.

The happy encounter is faith, the unThe Appendix, subtitled "An Acoustic

Illusion" deals with offense.

Climacus maintains that all

offense is passive at its root.

Offense does not act and

thereby establish the Paradox or the Unknown.

Rather, of-

fense is the passive reaction which merely echoes the Paradox.
The offended understanding will say "1 do not understand;
it's absurd; it does not make sense; it is unreasonable;
etc."

All these statements sound like active pronouncements

by the offended consciousness on the Paradox, but they are
mere acoustic illusions because all those statements are
"echoings of the Paradox."

The more profoundly the passion

is incited in the offended consciousness, the more vividly
evident its debt is to the Paradox.

The offended conscious-

ness protests "The Paradox is absurd!"

"But it was not the

Reason that made the discovery; on the contrary, it was the
Paradox that made the discovery, and now receives this testimony from the offended consciousness.

The Reason says that

the Paradox is absurd, but this is mere mimicry since the
.276
Paradox is the Paradox, quia absurdum.

In fact, "the

276
Kierkec2ard, Philosophical Frazpents. p. 65.

1314
offended consciousness can be taken as an indirect proof of
the validity of the Paradox."277
In Training in Christianity, Anti-Climacus, the pseudonym who is Christian to an extraordinary degree, presents an
essay entitled "The Offense."

It is almost amazing to see him

extract from Scripture so many passages which present the
theme of offense and echo Christ's statement "Blessed is he
who is not offended in me.-

The offensiveness of Christ can

be seen in his "collision with the established order.273

The

Pharisees were offended in Christ because He did not cornpletely comply with the codes of the established form of
Judaism.

But Christ served to "provoke the established order

out of its self-complacency."279

The established order was

"rational," 'the secularization of everything.,,280

In com-

pliance with the established order, men only worship their
own devices.

When the individual steps out of this order to

follow Christ, it appears that he has made himself "more than
281
a man"
and this too offends.
Offense also reacts to an individual man speaking or
acting as though he were God.

One can point to the miracles

performed by the man as proof that he is God, but such proofs
only serve to attract attention to the man.

"The miracle

277
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can prove nothing; for if you do not believe that he is what
282
he says he is, you deny the miracle."

Also offense can

react against the notion that God would reveal Himself in the
lowly state of a poor, suffering man.

The people of Nazareth

were in this way offended when Christ returned to His home
town.

Peter's denial of Christ can be seen as this type of

offense.

The thief on the cross who rejected Christ also ex-

hibited this sort of offense.
The thrust of the discussion of offense is to place
the individual in a crisis*

either be offended or believe.

The object of either of these two respcnses is the person of
Christ in His claim to be God.
So inseparable from faith is the possibility of offense that if the God -Man were not the possibility of
offense, He could not be the object of faith . . .
But whether one does away with faith or with the possibility of offense, one does away at the same time
with something else - the God -Man. And if one does
away with the God -Man, one does away with Christianity.2b3
The "happy understanding" which has overcome the offensiveness of Christ is faith.

Faith has two aspects*

its

objet, Christ, and its passion, the Christian existence.
"Faith has in fact two tasks:

to take care in every moment

to discover the improbable, the paradox; and then •to hold it
fast with the passion of inwardnes3."284
Religiousness B.

Faith characterizes

The believer is called to constantly fashion

his existence around Christ.

"It requires that the individual

282Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, p. 99.
p. 143.
284Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 209.
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should existentially venture all (the pathetic) . .

But

Christianity also requires that the individual risk his
thought, venturing to believe against the understanding (the
285
dialectical)."
The acceptance of Christ in faith always appears
risky

286

and d1fficult.287

This is because the believer is

required to appropriate a quality of life which is completely
different and, even, antithetical to him.

Also the appropria-

tion cannot be based on anything except the "condition"
given by Christ.

All proofs and logical evidences offer no

aid to faith because faith is not received through "scientific
.288
inquiry.

"In so far, the believer is equally free to

assume it; equally free, let us note this well, for if he
had assumed it by virtue of any proof he would have been on
.
289
the verge of giving up his faith.
290
Faith establishes the believer as a new creature.
Kierkegaard deals with a very contemporary issue here, that of
personal identity.

The problem with the "old" creature is

that in spite of the Socratic plea to "know thyself," selfknowledge is impossible.

But now, as a new creature, personal

285Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
r"

384.

28
6Ibid., P. 182.
287
Ibid., p. 527.
288
Ibid., P. 30.
289Ib1d., p. 31.
29
°Ibid., p. 510.
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identity can be substantiated.

Now the believer's reality

has its foundation in and derives its content from Christ.
As a new creature, all things are the believers.

"For

the movements of faith must constantly be made by virtue of
the absurd, yet in such a way, be it observed, that one does
not lose the finite but gains it every inch."291

Here

s the

difference between the man of resignation and the man of
faith.

In resignation, one concentrates on resigning the

finite, but in faith the finite is rained.
is therefore aesthetically appreciative.

The man of faith
He is consistently

ethical and he maintains a personal pathos of resignation and
suffering.

But at the roof of the man is his faith which is

directed to Christ keeping proper priority in his life.
As a new creature, the man of faith will also display a new set of emotions.

"Faith therefore is not an

aesthetic emotion but something far higher, precisely because
it has resignation as its presupposition; it is not an immediate instinct of the heart, but is paradox of life and
existence.

292

Christian emotions are more than mere sub-

jective feeling.

They must reflect a specific content and

occur within a specific context, i.e. God's revelation.
To be shaken (pretty much in the sense that one
speaks of snaking a person to make him wake up) is
the more universal foundation for all religiousness;
the experience of being shaken, of being deeply moved,
the coming into being of subjectivity in the inwardness of emotion, the pious pagan and the pious Jew
have in common with the Christian. Upon this common
291
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 48.
292
Ib1d., p. 58.
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basis of more universal emotion the qualitative difference must be erected and make itself felt, for the
more universal emotion has reference only to something abstractt to be moved by something higher,
something eternal, by an idea. And one does not become a Christian by being moved by something indefinitely higher, and not every outpouring of religious
emotion is a Christian outpouring. That is to sayi
emotion which is Christian is checked by definition
of concepts, and when emotion is transposed or expressed in words in order to be communicated, this
transposition must occur onstantly within the definition of the concepts.'-9)
Christian existence is established in the realm of
faith.

By guiding the reader through the stages to the

sphere of faith, Kierkegaard has accomplished his goalt
has shown what it is to become a Christian.

he

The Christian

passionately aligns his existence with Christ's.

Thus, the

faith of a Christian constitutes the dialectical movement
between the objective reality of Christ and the subjective
reality of the believer.
The thing of being a Christian is not determined by
the what of Christianity but by the how of the
Christian. This now can only correspond with one
thing, the absolute paradox . . . but to believe is
specifically different from all other appropriation
and inwardness. Faith is the objective uncertainty
due to the repulsion of the absurd held fast by the
passion of inwardness, which in this instance is intensified to the utmost degree. This formula fits
only the believer, no one else, not a lover, not an
enthusiast, not a thinker, but simply and solely gle
believer who is related to the absolute paradox.294
Thus the proper perspective on Kierkegaard is that he
is a corrective.

His entire life and authorship is a sacri-

fice to counter the tendencies of mediation, objectivity, and
293Kierkegaard, Authority and Revelation, p. 163.
294Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 54C.

139
idealism.

Kierkegaard does battle in the philosophical, the

theological and the cultural arenas.

He maieutically deals

with each individual reader, leading him through the
various stages of existence until he confronts him with the
possibility of appropriating the existence of Christ.

A

sensitivity for the concept of the dialectical proves to be
an invaluable tool for interpreting and understanding the
writings of Soren Kierkegaard.

Once Kierkegaard is under-

stood as a corrective, then he must be welcomed as a member
of the Christian community.

Certainly it is clear that

Kierkegaard has no interest in the contemporary philosophy
Existentialism; his work with existence is purely with the
intent of bringing his reader to a realization of his own
existence in relation to Christ's.

It is therefore Christ

who determined the method and message of Kierkegaard's authorship.

Only by understanding his love for his Lord can his

activity as a corrective be understood.
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